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Abstract. We introduce a new simple game, which is referred to as the com-
plementary weighted multiple majority game (C-WMMG for short). C-WMMG
models a basic cooperation rule, the complementary cooperation rule, and can be
taken as a sister model of the famous weighted majority game (WMG for short).
In C-WMMG, each player is characterized by a nonnegative vector with a fixed
dimension, and players in the same coalition cooperate by producing a character-
istic vector for this coalition (each dimension of this vector equals the maximum
of the corresponding dimensions of its members). The value of a coalition is 1
if and only if the sum of its characteristic vector is larger than that of its com-
plementary coalition, in which case the coalition is called winning. Otherwise,
the coalitional value is 0. In this paper, we concentrate on the two dimensional
C-WMMG. An interesting property of this case is that there are at most n + 1
minimal winning coalitions (MWC for short), and they can be enumerated in time
O(n log n), where n is the number of players. This property guarantees that the two
dimensional C-WMMG is more handleable than WMG. In particular, we prove
that the main power indices, i.e. the Shapley-Shubik index, the Penrose-Banzhaf
index, the Holler-Packel index, and the Deegan-Packel index, are all polynomi-
ally computable. To make a comparison with WMG, we know that it may have
exponentially many MWCs, and none of the four power indices is polynomially
computable (unless P=NP). Still for the two dimensional case, we show that local
monotonicity holds for all of the four power indices. In WMG, this property is
possessed by the Shapley-Shubik index and the Penrose-Banzhaf index, but not
by the Holler-Packel index or the Deegan-Packel index. Since our model fits very
well the cooperation and competition in team sports, we hope that it can be poten-
tially applied in measuring the values of players in team sports, say help people
give more objective ranking of NBA players and select MVPs, and consequently
bring new insights into contest theory and the more general field of sports eco-
nomics. It may also provide some interesting enlightenments into the design of
non-additive voting mechanisms. Last but not least, the threshold version of C-
WMMG is a generalization of WMG, and natural variants of it are closely related
with the famous airport game and the stable marriage/roommates problem.
Keywords: complementary cooperation, complementary weighted multiple ma-
jority games, weighted majority games, power indices, minimal winning coali-
tions, local monotonicity
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1 Introduction
Cooperation makes human being flourish. For other animals, competition plays an abso-
lutely dominant role, and cooperation is never so deep or broad [21]. Game theoretical
models, both the coalitional ones and the strategic ones, are basic tools for studying co-
operation. Generally speaking, strategic models are suitable for scenarios where coop-
eration is necessary but seems impossible in one-shot games, that is, Nash equilibrium
is not Pareto optimal. So the main research focus in strategic form games on coopera-
tion is whether cooperation is attainable in sequential games (either repeatedly or not),
and how to promote cooperation (cf. [6,16,43,48,61,62]). Coalitional models, in con-
trast, are suitable for scenarios where the attainability of cooperation is not a problem
(because it is usually assumed that there is a powerful arbitrator), but how to cooperate
is, i.e. how to share the benefit gained by cooperation fairly among players [69].
However, the concept of fairness is so ambiguous and debatable that there could be
numerous impossibility theorems in coalitional game theory. This fact might have been
neglected by most researchers in coalitional game theory. There does exist one common
spirit behind fairness: the more you contribute the more you should get. How to measure
the contributions of players, nonetheless, is not an easy job. And in fact, it is as tricky as
how to interpret fairness. So this common spirit helps us very little, if any. Another issue
is that in coalitional game theory, It is often very difficult to distinguish whether a study
is normative or positive, and fair allocation is also frequently interpreted as possible
allocation that will occur among rational players, and this allocation is determined by
bargaining powers of players. Consequently, benefit allocating, contribution measuring,
and power measuring are usually triune in the study of coalitional games.
There are mainly two reasons why it is so hard to have a completely satisfactory
allocation rule. The first comes from the self-contradictions of the concept of fairness,
which are not easy to be noticed by intuition. And at the same time people are trying
to design rules that are consistent with every aspect of it. The second is due to that in
coalitional game theory people usually try to design a general allocation rule suitable for
all possible coalitional games (with very weak restrictions, say super-additivity), which
is a work that will never be accomplished. And this is why there can be numerous
impossibility theorems in the coalitional game theory.
That “the cooperative side of game theory has been dominated by the noncoopera-
tive side, at least judging from their respective influence on mainstream economics” is
an undeniable fact (Maskin, 2003, [57]). Further discussion of this problem is beyond
the task of this paper (and beyond the ability of the authors), but based on the argu-
ments in the above two paragraphs, one of the right ways we think is to give up the
dream of finding a universally perfect solution, forget the concept of fairness, only dis-
cuss various properties (e.g. various consistencies, monotonicities, cf. [69]), and leave
the choosing right of which solution is more suitable to the game theory users and the
real players. And what’s more, pay more attention to more concrete models. We are
happy to see that this is also what many researcher are doing today in this field.
Perhaps the most extensively studied and most successfully used concrete model in
the coalitional game theory is the weighted majority game (WMG for short). The main
contribution of this paper is to propose a new coalitional game, which can be taken as a
sister of WMG.
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1.1 Additive cooperation VS. complementary cooperation
One of the main reasons why WMG receives so much attention and finds successful
applications may come from the fact that it is both simple and fundamental. Simpleness
implies richness, because only simple rules can exist behind wide range of situations,
and only simple rules can be understood and used well by human being. Simpleness
of this model is obvious. It is also very fundamental, because it models a very basic
cooperation rule.
Suppose party A has 100 votes, and party B has 30 votes, then cooperation between
the two parties means that they possess totally 130 votes. And with 130 votes, they may
beat party C with 120 votes, which seems no possible at all if they do not cooperate.
You have a strength of 50 Kg, I have 40 Kg, working together we can move a stone
which is too heavy for any single of us. You have 1000 dollars, I have 1500, pooling
them we may buy a car that neither of us can afford separately. No other cooperation
rule, as far as we can imagine, could be simpler than this. Since the process of this kind
of cooperation can be nicely characterized by the mathematical operation of addition,
we name it the additive cooperation rule 1.
There is another cooperation rule, which is also very simple and fundamental. Sup-
pose country A can produce 10 units cattle or 3 units wheat in one year, while in one
year country B can produce 4 units cattle or 9 units wheat. Then country A has absolute
advantage in producing cattle and country B in wheat. Therefore, their maximum over-
all productivity is max{10, 4} = 10 units cattle and max{3, 9} = 9 units wheat, which can
be achieved by letting each country producing which she has advantage. It is absurd to
think that the two countries’ total productivity is 10+ 4 = 14 units cattle and 9+ 3 = 12
units wheat.
In basketball, there are five positions: point guard, shooting guard, small forward,
power forward, and center. Each basketball player can play any of the five positions with
varied levels. For a basketball team, its level in each of the five positions is determined
by the highest level, rather than the sum, of all its players. And the overall level of a
team is determined by certain aggregation (say, taking average, or equivalently sum)
of its five separate levels. For football, things are similar, except that there are eleven
positions instead of five (some of the positions are identical).
Cooperations in the above two examples have obvious differences with the additive
cooperation rule. (i) It has multiple rather than single roles. (ii) The most efficient co-
operation strategy is to let each role be played by the one who can play it best. We call
this kind of cooperation the complementary cooperation rule.
The complementary cooperation rule prevails not only in economy, team sports (not
including tug of war), but also in many other fields of the society. In fact, it embodies
very well the division of labor, and thus plays a fundamental role in civilization. The
functioning of the society depends severely on numerous complementary cooperations.
Even marriage can be taken as a kind of complementary cooperation. And so is sex-
1 Another choice is to name it as the “substitute cooperation”, as we shall name its counterpart as
the “complementary cooperation”. However, we finally abandoned this more fashionable term,
because “substitute” and “complementary” have very rich implications in economics that are
quite popular but significantly different from what we intend to express.
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ual reproduction for any kind of species that is using it. Another striking example of
complementary cooperation that is observed frequently in biology is symbiosis 2.
To a great extent, additive cooperation is quantitative change, and complementary
cooperation is structural and qualitative change. In this sense, we can safely argue that
complementary cooperation is at least as fundamental as additive cooperation.
1.2 Virtual integration and the story of Dell
Let’s see a real case of Dell in this subsection. This case is quite famous in the field
of management science (for more detailed information, see [56]), and embodies the
essence of complementary cooperation very well.
During the inception of the computer industry, each company had to produce all the
computer components: it had to manufacture the disk drives, memory chips, monitors,
application softwares, and even its own graphics chips. And of course it had to do its
own marketing. When Dell entered this industry, it took quite a different strategy: Dell
did not create any component itself, but bought them from its partners. All they did
was to concentrate on a brand-new marketing mode, the nowadays well known direct
mode, which made it so close not only to the customers but also to the suppliers that
its founder Michael Dell called Dell and its partners as “virtually integrated”. This new
kind of cooperation was remarkably close to such an extent that virtually integrated
companies could be seemed in a great sense as a big whole company. For a simple
instance, the cooperation with the monitor supplier Sony was roughly like this: Sony
put the brand of Dell on each monitor, and Dell told the third-party logistics company
UPS to pick up the exact number of monitors they needed every day from the plant
of Sony and to deliver them directly to the customers. No warehouse, no inventory, no
inefficient transportation, and even no quality testing. All liked in the same company.
As we have seen, virtual integration made a great success, helping Dell grow into a $12
billion company in just 13 years (1984-1997), and also bringing its partners large profit.
From the aspect of division of labor, what Dell and its partners did is quite easy to
understand: Intel is expert in making CPUs, Sony in Monitors, and Dell in marketing.
Working together, they provide excellent computers for customers and beat their com-
petitors. This kind of cooperation, i.e. virtual integration, is in fact a specialization that
penetrates the whole economy of our society and plays an essential role in the civiliza-
tion of the human being, and it can be well modeled by the complementary cooperation
rule that we have discussed in the last subsection.
1.3 Profit allocation, players evaluation, and benchwarmers’ contribution
Profit allocation (or cost sharing) is the key topic in cooperative game theory, and is also
one of the critical issues in complementary cooperation. In the example of producing
two goods, what is the fairest way to allocate the final goods? In virtual integration, how
to share the total profit? Although this issue is usually rather complicated in the real
2 This concept can be found in any textbook about biology. For a recent theoretical study of
symbiosis in bacteria, see Katsuyama et. al. [50]. The term of “complementary cooperation”
was coined by them, independently with us. And this is why we noticed that paper.
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world, and perhaps people have already found a way out (e.g. in the example discussed
in the previous subsection, Dell played a dominant role, and hence the real story is that
it negotiated one by one with its potential partners), and the word “fairness” is really
ambiguous, theoretical research is still meaningful.
For the example of basketball, profit allocation turns out to be players evaluation.
This is a meaningful problem in both theory and practice. For an NBA final champion
team, it is interesting to know who contributes most and if every player is worth his
salary. Different people may have quite different ideas. Is there any more objective way
to do this? Can we give a convincing way to rank all the players according to their val-
ues? Is it possible to give some scientific suggestions on how to select the MVP or how
to trade players more wisely? All these problems fall into the topic of players evalua-
tion, and in some sense they are equivalent to the problem of profit allocation, the focus
of the cooperative game theory (in WMG, as well as C-WMMG, the model proposed
by this paper, this is equivalent to players’ power measuring. The famous formulas for
measuring players’ power are called power indices, which will be introduced very soon
in Subsection 1.7). Of course, we should not expect that one simple theory can com-
pletely solve all the real world complicated problems, but theoretical discussion is the
necessary first step and it may play a crucial role in the final solution.
One interesting property of the example of basketball is that the evaluation of bench-
warmers is not that obvious to study, compared with the key players frequently appear-
ing on the court. As mentioned in Subsection 1.1, at any fixed time there can be at most
five players on the court for any basketball team. However, we all know that usually a
team has far more than five players in total. The immediate reason for keeping bench-
warmers is that key players may suffer from injuries frequently, and even without injury
no player can always play 48 minutes every game. Another reason that is not so obvious
is that even if a benchwarmer is not good enough to play any position at all in team A,
s/he may be able to help team B to beat team A. Just consider the situation that the cen-
ter of team B really sucks that s/he becomes a bottleneck. Although team B is stronger
than team A in all the other positions, still it can not beat team A. With the joining of
that benchwarmer from team A, who is not really very good but much better than the
current center in team B, however, it is very likely for team B to beat team A. In this
situation, it is a very natural strategy for team A to keep that benchwarmer by giving
him/her a high enough salary. And s/he deserves it, probably without doing anything at
all except for applauding.
It is a pity that we failed to find a nice case study in NBA, or FIFA, that illustrates the
importance of a benchwarmer in so extreme case that we discussed. Although there are
examples where very lucky benchwarmers got the champion ring, their importance in
the competing teams is not obviously high either. In general market competition, there is
a well-known aggressive and effective strategy: first hire more than necessary employ-
ees (usually top talents) from your competitors with, say double or triple salaries, then,
after beating them, sack all the redundant employees, i.e. benchwarmers. Although this
strategy is quite controversial and likely to have legal problems, it demonstrates clearly
that the importance of benchwarmers has been realized very well by business people.
Therefore, to evaluate the accurate contributions of employees/players and offer
corresponding salaries, not only what they have done should be calculated, but also
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what they did not do, i.e. their abilities of potential harm to the organization by hopping
to the competitors, should be carefully considered. As we shall see soon, this factor is
fully recognized by the main power indices in the study of game theory.
1.4 Pure complementary cooperation
Although they are both complementary cooperations, the examples of production and
basketball still have several significant differences.
(i) Let’s consider the situation where the number of players is greater than that of
roles. In basketball, there can be at most five players cooperating for each team on the
court at any fixed time. For the example of producing two products, the cooperation of
three players is meaningful, because it is possible for two of them to produce the same
kind of production and the overall productivity of this product is the sum of the two
players’ productivity.
(ii) For the basketball, it is possible for any player to play multiple roles on the
court (consider the case where one player fouls out). This is not the case, however, for
the production example. Suppose country A is more productive than country B in both
products. Then country A should still focus on producing one product and country B on
the other one in which it has comparative advantage, and therefore cooperation is still
possible. The critical reason is that each country has limited time for production. This
theory, first described by D. Ricardo in 1817 and usually called the law of comparative
advantage, is one of the most fundamental principals of economics (cf. [58]).
Based on the above discussions, the complementary cooperation in basketball games
seems much cleaner than that in production games. It is not satisfactory to use com-
plementary cooperation alone to model the production example. In fact, as argued in
point (i) above, the cooperation in the production game is a mixture of additive coop-
eration and complementary cooperation. The cooperation in the basketball, however,
can be perfectly described by the complementary cooperation rule alone. This kind of
pure complementary cooperation is the focus of this paper. Of course it can be argued
that the positions of the basketball game are actually not completely independent, what
players really do is usually not that clear-cut, and perhaps more importantly, whenever
a player has to play double positions (when one of his partners fouls out), his actual
levels should be reduced in each of these positions. We have to say that all these con-
siderations are correct. However, as a theoretical study, we need to do some necessary
assumptions to make the problem clean enough. We believe that our assumptions are
mild and acceptable.
We shall begin our study with a model that is as simple as possible as long as
it embodies the essence of (pure) complementary cooperation, and thus concentrate
on simple games [77], i.e. coalitional games where each coalitional value is either 1
or 0 (and with several plain restrictions). Although this assumption seems at the first
glance too simple and even artificial, it models the nature of cooperation: by cooperation
people can do something that may never be done by any single person. Back to the field
of team sports, our assumption is that the unique objective of all teams is the final
champion. Of course, externality in this model will be inevitable, because otherwise
benchwarmers will be useless. That is to say, our model, strictly speaking, is not of
the characteristic function form, but of the more general partition function form [55].
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However, this partition function is a quite trivial one. In fact, it can be reduced to a
characteristic function (as we shall see in the subsection below). And therefore we shall
take the terms of characteristic function form coalitional game theory. To study more
general models (say runner-up is also valuable, besides champion), terms of partition
function form coalitional game theory may be inevitable.
1.5 Model description and basic notations
Formally, we are given a set of players N = {p1, p2, · · · , pn}. Each player p j (1 ≤ j ≤ n)
is characterized by a d0 dimensional non-negative vector (p1j , p2j , · · · , pd0j ), which is
referred to as her characteristic vector. For any coalition C, i.e. a subset of N, we
denote by
(q1(C), · · · , qd0 (C)) =
(
max{p1j : p j ∈ C}, · · · ,max{p
d0
j : p j ∈ C}
)
its characteristic vector, and
q(C) =
d0∑
i=1
qi(C)
its competitive power.
We say that a coalition C is a winning coalition (also abbreviated as WC) iff q(C) >
q(C−), where C− = N \ C. The value of a coalition is 1 if it is a winning coalition, and
0 otherwise.
We shall refer to this model as the complementary weighted multiple majority game,
because it has a symmetric relation with a special case of the well-known weighted
multiple majority game (to be introduced in the next subsection). It is straightforward
that C-WMMG is super-additive, though its core is usually empty.
A winning coalition is called a minimal winning coalition (MWC for short) if it
does not have any proper subset that is also winning. We also use WC to denote the set
of WCs, and MWC the set of MWCs.
The following two concepts are from the classical literature of WMG. For any win-
ning coalition C, p j ∈ C is called a decisive player (w.r.t. C) if C \ {p j} is losing. If
C \ {p j} is still winning, p j is called a null player (w.r.t. C). We shall also interchange-
ably use the term indecisive. Trivially, all the players in an MWC are decisive.
In this paper, we shall concentrate on the two dimensional C-WMMG.
The next two concepts are new. For any coalition C and k ∈ {1, 2}, denote by
Ak(C) = {p j ∈ C : pkj = qk(C)} the set of players whose k-th dimensions are the
largest among players in C, and by B(C) = A1(C) ∪ A2(C) the set of players who have
at least one dimension that is largest among players in C.
We call players in B(C) busy players (w.r.t. C) and players in C\B(C) benchwarmers
(w.r.t. C).
Notice that it is possible that C has more than two busy players, and it is also possi-
ble that C has only one busy player.
We also let A(C) = A1(C) × A2(C) = {(p j1 , p j2) : p j1 ∈ A1(C), p j2 ∈ A2(C)} be the
set of best pairs. Members of A1(C) and A2(C) will also be referred to as busy-1 players
and busy-2 players (w.r.t. C), respectively.
All the above terms and notations will be used throughout this paper.
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1.6 Mathematical relation with the weighted multiple majority game
The weighted majority game (a.k.a. weighted voting game, weighted simple game,
weighted threshold game), first formulated by von Neumann (1944, [63]), is one of
the most intensively studied cooperative game models.
A WMG is usually represented by G = (q; a1, a2, · · · , an), where q is called the
quota and a j the weight of player p j. The characteristic function is defined as: v(C) = 1
iff
∑
p j∈C a j ≥ q; v(C) = 0 otherwise. The special case of q = ⌊(
∑
p j∈N a j)/2⌋ + 1, i.e.
v(C) = 1 is equivalent to ∑p j∈C a j > ∑p j∈C− a j, is called the simple weighted majority
game.
Let G1 = (q1; p11, p12, · · · , p1n) and G2 = (q2; p21, p22, · · · , p2n) be two WMGs with
identical player set, whose characteristic functions are v1 and v2, respectively. G =
G1 +G2, the sum of G1 and G2, is a simple game with characteristic function v, defined
as v(C) = 1 iff at least one of v1(C) and v2(C) equals 1. The sum of k WMGs is usually
called a k dimensional WMMG, which can be defined similarly.
Suppose that G = G1 + G2 + · · · + Gd0 is the sum of d0 simple WMGs, i.e. qi =
⌊(∑p j pij)/2⌋ + 1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ d0. It is obvious that v(C) = 1 is equivalent to
max
1≤i≤d0

∑
p j∈C
pij −
∑
p j∈C−
pij
 > 0. (1)
While in the model of this paper, v(C) = 1 is equivalent to
∑
1≤i≤d0
(
max
p j∈C
{pij} − maxp j∈C−
{pij}
)
> 0. (2)
It can be observed that there is some symmetry between the two models, and this is
one of the reasons why we named our model as C-WMMG. To have more knowledge
about WMG and WMMG, please refer [77].
1.7 Main power indices
How to measure powers of players in WMG is a very interesting topic that has rich
applications in politics, because the direct measurement by weights is not reasonable at
all. Ever since the seminal work of Shapley and Shubik [74], this topic keeps attracting
scientists from political science, law, game theory, and computer science. As discussed
in Subsection 1.3, this is also the main focus of this paper. There are typically four
widely accepted approaches, namely the Shapley-Shubik index, the Penrose-Banzhaf
index, the Holler-Packel index, and the Deegen-Packel index.
Recall that WC is the set of WCs, and MWC the set of MWCs. The Shapley-
Shubik index [74] is a direct application of the celebrated Shapley value [72] on WMGs.
It argues that the bargaining power of each player is equal to her expected marginal
contribution, assuming that players arrive one by one in a random order. For all p j ∈ N,
let
WC( j) = {C ∈ WC : C ∋ p j,C \ {p j} <WC}, (3)
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i.e. the set of winning coalitions where p j is decisive. The exact definition of the
Shapley-Shubik index is as follows:
ss j =
∑
C∈WC( j)
(|C| − 1)!(n − |C|)!
n!
, (4)
where the | · | is the cardinality of any set and will be used throughout this paper.
As unearthed by Felsenthal and Machover [25,26,27], the first theoretical study of
power measurement in WMG should be attributed to Penrose [68]. Please refer Felsen-
thal and Machover for more details where they discuss measuring power as a way of
measuring influence, or as a way of measuring the rewards of winning.
Banzhaf [7], many years after Penrose first published his work, proposed an equiv-
alent voting power index. The Penrose-Banzhaf index assumes that all coalitions are
equally likely to form. The exact definition is as follows:
pb j =
1
2n−1
|WC( j)|. (5)
Unlike the above two indices determined by the chance of being decisive, the Holler-
Packel index (or Public Good Index, see [34,37]) and the Deegen-Packel index [17] ar-
gue that only MWCs will possibly form. This argument is initially known as the Riker’s
size principle, see [23,70]. Let
MWC( j) = {C ∈ MWC : C ∋ p j}, (6)
the definitions of the (un-normalized) Holler-Packel index and the (un-normalized)
Deegen-Packel index are as follows:
hp j = |MWC( j)|, (7)
dp j =
∑
C∈MWC( j)
1
|C|
. (8)
1.8 Contribution and organization of this paper
Because there has already been several very famous power indices for measuring val-
ues of players in WMG (as shown in Subsection 1.7), our objective of this paper is not
to propose any new measurement especially for C-WMMG, but naturally to study the
properties of the old ones on C-WMMG. This can serve at least as a first step of the
study of C-WMMG. In particular, much effort of this paper is devoted to the computa-
tional issue, as this has been always one of the core problems for the model of WMG
and has been attracting a large amount of attention ever since the beginning of this field.
The computational issue is also one of the core focuses for the booming relatively new
research field algorithmic game theory [64]. As one of the main power indices is sim-
ply an application of the famous Shapley value, which is one of the few key concepts
in coalitional game theory, widely used in many fields, but hard to compute in general,
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one of our findings that the Shapley value can be efficiently computed for the two di-
mensional C-WMMG has its own theoretical interest to the field of algorithmic game
theory. In fact, as far as we know, the two dimensional C-WMMG is the only nontrivial
special case where the Shapley value can be efficiently computed, besides the classical
model of the airport game [53,54].
Our main findings are summarized as follows (we remind the reader again that we
restrict our discussion in this paper to the two dimensional C-WMMG, unless explicitly
stated otherwise.):
(i) The structure of the set of MWCs is quite simple. To be precise, the total number
of MWCs in the two dimensional C-WMMG can be upper-bounded by n+ 1 (Theorem
1, Section 3), and the whole set of MWCs can be computed in time O(n log n) (Theorem
3, Appendix A).
It is well known that the set of MWCs plays a fundamental rule for any simple game,
because it determines the complete structure of this game. In fact, the most general
form of a simple game is defined as the set of its MWCs [77]. The structure of the set
of MWCs for WMG is generally very complicated [23]. Even in simple WMGs, and
hence in higher dimensional cases, the number of MWCs can be exponentially large.
This can be verified easily by a trivial example with an odd number of players and all
players having identical weight. In fact, any coalition with (n + 1)/2 members is an
MWC, and there are C(n+1)/2n ≈ 2n
√
2n
π(n2−1) such coalitions (by Stirling’s formula). For
simple WMGs, it is even NP-hard to compute the minimum MWC, i.e. the one with the
smallest total weight, which can be easily proved by reduction to the partition problem
[42].
Although the two dimensional C-WMMG has a symmetric relation with the sum of
two simple WMGs as shown in Subsection 1.6, it has a much simpler and thus theoret-
ically more handleable structure. It still remains open whether it is still so for the three
or higher dimensional cases.
(ii) Each of the four power indices can be computed in polynomial time.
Due to the simple structure of MWCs (Appendix A), this result is not surprising for
the Holler-Packel index or the Deegan-Packel index, because their definitions are based
on MWCs (Appendix B). The Penrose-Banzhaf index and the Shapley-Shubik index,
however, are both based on winning coalitions, which can be exponentially many. We
show that the structure of the set of winning coalitions is not complicated either. In
fact, they can be determined by critical ones that are not so many and thus can be repre-
sented implicitly in polynomial time (Appendix C). Consequently, the Penrose-Banzhaf
index and the Shapley-Shubik index can both be efficiently computed (Appendix D). In
contrast, none of the four power indices is polynomially computable for WMG, unless
P=NP.
(iii) Local monotonicity holds for each of the four power indices (Section 4).
There are many widely discussed monotonicity concepts for power indices of WMG,
e.g. the local monotonicity, the re-distribution monotonicity, the new member mono-
tonicity, the bloc monotonicity, etc.. They are also known as paradoxes and postulates,
see [25,36] for extensive study. The local monotonicity says that players with larger
weights should have more power than the ones with smaller weights. We focus above
all on local monotonicity for C-WMMG, rather than any other monotonicity concept,
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because we think that this concept is the most natural one among all the similar con-
cepts, and thus is the first property that we expect any power index to possess. In WMG,
we know that local monotonicity is possessed by the Shapley-Shubik index and the
Penrose-Banzhaf index, but not by the Holler-Packel index or the Deegan-Packel index
[36].
For the Shapley-Shubik index and the Penrose-Banzhaf index, local monotonicity
holds trivially for any dimensional C-WMMG. We show that local monotonicity holds
for the Holler-Packel index and the Deegan-Packel index in the two dimensional C-
WMMG (Theorem 2), but not in the three or higher dimensional cases (Example 4).
We remind the reader that we didn’t say that possessing the property of local mono-
tonicity, or any other monotonicity, is a necessary or good thing for any power index
and failing to possess it is bad. We agree with Holler and Naple [36] that the violation
of local monotonicity is not a fatal drawback in power measuring at all, as taken for
granted by many researchers. And perhaps it might be this violation that reflects the
strategic powers of seemingly weak players.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section gives a very short
literature review. Section 3 is for the structure of the set of MWCs and the upper bound
of its cardinality. Local monotonicity is discussed in Section 4. All the computational
technical details, which are theoretically not very hard but really complicated, ugly, and
rather tedious for the reader, are moved to appendices. To be specific, Appendix A is for
computing the MWCs, Appendix B for the Holler-Packel index and the Deegan-Packel
index, Appendix C for the structure of winning coalitions, and Appendix D for the
Penrose-Banzhaf index and the Shapley-Shubik index. In the discussions of Appendix
A to Appendix D, quite a few notations are used. To help the reader not get lost, we
provide a list of notations in Appendix E. Section 5 concludes this paper by pointing
out several interesting topics for further research.
2 Literature Review
The classical and traditional literature on WMG is too vast for us to give a complete
review, we refer the reader to the standard book of Taylor and Zwicker [77]. We shall
mainly concentrate on the computational side of this field.
Ever since Owen’s seminal work on computing the Shaply-Shubik index through
multilinear extension of a game [65], the computational issue of power indices for
WMGs has been attracting a lot of attention of scholars from game theory. Literature
following Owen’s idea can be found in Alonso-Meijide et. al. [2]. The generating func-
tion method is another important, but relatively new, way to computing power indices,
see Algaba et. al. [1]. Fatima et. al. [28] provided another algorithm, which runs in lin-
ear time, as in Owen’s multilinear extension algorithm, but has a smaller approximation
error (on average).
In the last decade, this problem also began to attract the attention of scholars from
theoretical computer science and operations research. Below is a short review.
Matsui and Matsui [59,60] proved that the problems of computing the Shapley-
Shubik index, the Penrose-Banzhaf index, and the Deegan-Packel index in WMG, are
all NP-hard, and there are pseudo-polynomial time dynamic programming algorithms
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for them. Deng and Papadimitriou [18], who pioneered in the study of computational
complexities for cooperative solution concepts, also proved that it is #P-complete to
compute the Shapley-Shubik index. Matsui and Matsui [60] also observed that Deng
and Papadimitriou’s proof can be easily carried over to the problem of computing the
Penrose-Banzhaf index. For the special case of simple WMG, it can be observed from
their proofs that all the above complexity results hold. It is still not hard to prove that
computing the Holler-Packel index in WMG, even in the special case of simple WMG,
is NP-hard, and the algorithm of Matsui and Matsui [60] for computing the Deegan-
Packel index can trivially be modified to compute the Holler-Packel index, with an
even lower time complexity [11].
Other work on the computation of power indices includes [2,52]. For the computa-
tional issues of more solution concepts on WMG, see Elkind et. al. [19,20,30]. For the
recent research on the structure of MWCs in WMG, see [5]. The Penrose-Banzhaf index
and the Shapley-Shubik index can also be calculated using MWCs, see [49]. Studying
quota manipulating problems in WMGs is also a promising new direction [78].
3 Structure of the Set of MWCs and the Upper Bound of its
Cardinality
Please recall all the terms and notations in Subsection 1.3. We alert the reader that
almost all the notations, except the small ones such as i, j, k, t that are indicating player
identities or dimensional names, are global instead of local. They are valid throughout
this paper right after it is defined (appendices included).
First of all, we present a warmup example, which shows that, very interestingly, a
busy player in a winning coalition C may not be decisive. At the same time, however,
C may have a decisive player who is a benchwarmer.
Example 1. There are four players in total: p1 = (3, 3), p2 = (4, 0), p3 = (0, 2), p4 =
(5, 0). Then C = {p1, p2, p3} is a winning coalition. Obviously, p2 is busy in C but not
decisive, while p3, a benchwarmer, is decisive in C.
Lemma 1. In C-WMMG, each winning coalition contains at least one MWC.
Proof. This property is straightforward as for each winning coalition we can dump the
null players, if any, one by one until all of the remaining players are decisive. ⊓⊔
Lemma 2. In the two dimensional C-WMMG, if C is a winning coalition, then either
A1(N) ⊆ C or A2(N) ⊆ C.
Proof. Suppose on the contrary that neither relation holds. Then C− ∩ A1(N) , ∅ and
C− ∩ A2(N) , ∅, which imply that q1(C−) = q1(N) and q2(C−) = q2(N), and hence
q(C−) = q(N) ≥ q(C), which contradicts the fact that C is a winning coalition. ⊓⊔
3.1 Structure in the simple cases
We discuss the simplest case first.
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Lemma 3. In the two dimensional C-WMMG, suppose A1(N) ∩ A2(N) , ∅.
(a) If A1(N) = A2(N), then MWC = {A1(N)} = {A2(N)};
(b1) If A1(N) ⊂ A2(N), then MWC = {A1(N)};
(b2) If A2(N) ⊂ A1(N), then MWC = {A2(N)};
(c) If A1(N) ∩ A2(N) , ∅ but none of the conditions in (a) (b1) (b2) is true, then
MWC = {A1(N), A2(N)}.
Proof. (a) Since q(A1(N)) = q(N) and q(N \ A1(N)) < q(N), we know that A1(N)
is a winning coalition. Obviously, it is also minimal winning, because for any player
p j ∈ A1(N), we have q({p j}) = q(N), and hence q(A1(N) \ {p j}) ≤ q((N \ A1(N))∪ {p j}).
Due to Lemma 2, it is the only MWC.
(b1) First of all, A1(N) is a winning coalition, because q(A1(N)) = q(N) while
q(N \ A1(N)) < q(N) (note that q1(N \ A1(N)) < q1(N)). Since for each p j ∈ A1(N), we
have q({p j} ∪ (N \ A1(N))})=q({p j} ∪ {A2(N) \ A1(N)}) = q(N) ≥ q(A1(N) \ {p j}), A1(N)
is also minimal winning. Due to Lemma 2, it is the only MWC.
(b2) is symmetric to (b1).
(c) A1(N) is a winning coalition, because q(A1(N)) ≥ q(A1(N) ∩ A2(N)) = q(N) >
q(N\A1(N)). That the conditions in (a) and (b1) are not true implies that A2(N)\A1(N) ,
∅, and hence for each p j ∈ A1(N) we have q({p j}∪(N\A1(N))) = q(N) ≥ q(A1(N)\{p j}).
Due to the above argument, we know that A1(N) is a minimal winning coalition. Using
the same argument, we know that A2(N) is also a minimal winning coalition. Due to
Lemma 2, they are the only MWCs, and hence the lemma. ⊓⊔
Definition 1. We denote by m1 and m2 the number of busy-1 players and the number of
busy-2 players of the grand coalition N, respectively, i.e.
m1 = |A1(N)|, (9)
m2 = |A2(N)|. (10)
Lemma 4. In the two dimensional C-WMMG, suppose A1(N) ∩ A2(N) = ∅.
(a1) When A1(N) is a winning coalition:
MWC =

{
A1(N)
}
i f m1 = 1{
A1(N)
}
∪
{
A2(N) ∪ {pi} : pi ∈ A1(N)
}
i f m1 > 1
; (11)
(a2) When A2(N) is a winning coalition:
MWC =

{
A2(N)
}
i f m2 = 1{
A2(N)
}
∪
{
A1(N) ∪ {pi} : pi ∈ A2(N)
}
i f m2 > 1
. (12)
Proof. Since the two parts of this lemma are symmetric, we only prove part (a1). If m1 =
1, then any coalition containing the only player of A1(N) is winning, and any coalition
not containing her is losing, therefore A1(N) is the only MWC. We suppose in the rest of
this proof that m1 > 1. Because A1(N) is a winning coalition, and A1(N) ∩ A2(N) = ∅,
we know that it must be minimal winning, and therefore A1(N) ∈ MWC, and it is
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the only MWC that contains A1(N). Let C be an arbitrary MWC that does not contain
A1(N), i.e. A1(N) * C. By Lemma 2, we know that A2(N) ⊆ C. The hypothesis that
A1(N) is a winning coalition implies that C ∩ A1(N) , ∅, because otherwise C will not
be winning. We claim that C, if exists, contains exactly one player from A1(N). This
is true because if it contains more than one players from A1(N), any of these players
will not be decisive. Thus we have now
{
A2(N) ∪ {pi} : pi ∈ A1(N)
}
is the set of all
potential MWCs that does not contain A1(N). Using the hypothesis that m1 > 1, it is
easy to check that each coalition in
{
A2(N) ∪ {pi} : pi ∈ A1(N)
}
is indeed an MWC, and
hence the lemma. ⊓⊔
3.2 Structure in the complex case
Let’s now discuss the more general case.
Definition 2. Based on Lemma 2, we divide MWC into three sub-collections:
MWC1 =
{
C ∈ MWC : A1(N) ⊆ C, A2(N) ∩C = ∅
}
, (13)
MWC2 =
{
C ∈ MWC : A2(N) ⊆ C, A1(N) ∩C = ∅
}
, (14)
MWC3 =
{
C ∈ MWC : A1(N) ∩ C , ∅, A2(N) ∩ C , ∅
}
. (15)
The structure of MWC3 in the general case is simple.
Lemma 5. In the two dimensional C-WMMG, suppose A1(N)∩A2(N) = ∅, and neither
A1(N) nor A2(N) is a winning coalition, then
MWC3 =

{
A1(N) ∪ {pi} : pi ∈ A2(N)
}
i f m1 = 1{
A2(N) ∪ {pi} : pi ∈ A1(N)
}
i f m2 = 1⋃
pi∈A1(N)
{
A2(N) ∪ {pi}
}
∪
⋃
pi∈A2(N)
{
A1(N) ∪ {pi}
}
i f m1 > 1,m2 > 1
. (16)
Consequently,
|MWC3| =

m2 i f m1 = 1
m1 i f m2 = 1
m1 + m2 i f m1 > 1,m2 > 1
. (17)
Proof. Notice first, by Lemma 2 and the hypothesis that neither A1(N) nor A2(N) is a
winning coalition, that in any of the three cases, it holds that
MWC3 ⊆
⋃
pi∈A1(N)
{
A2(N) ∪ {pi}
}
∪
⋃
pi∈A2(N)
{
A1(N) ∪ {pi}
}
, (18)
and when m1 > 1,m2 > 1, the above inclusion relation holds as equality.
When m1 = 1,m2 > 1,
⋃
pi∈A1(N)
{
A2(N) ∪ {pi}
}
has only one member, A1(N) ∪ A2(N),
which is not minimal winning, because no player in A2(N) is decisive (remember the
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hypothesis that A1(N) ∩ A2(N) = ∅). Every coalition in
{
A1(N) ∪ {pi} : pi ∈ A2(N)
}
,
however, is obviously an MWC. Therefore in this case MWC3 =
{
A1(N) ∪ {pi} : pi ∈
A2(N)
}
, which still holds when m1 = 1 and m2 = 1. Hence the case m1 = 1 is valid, and
the case m2 = 1 is also true by symmetry. (17) is straightforward. ⊓⊔
Due to Lemma 3, Lemma 4 and Lemma 5, the following upper bound for the cardi-
nality of MWC3 is immediate.
Lemma 6. In the two dimensional C-WMMG, |MWC3| ≤ m1 + m2. ⊓⊔
To analyze MWC1 and MWC2, we need more notations.
Definition 3. We denote by M the set of benchwarmers in the grand coalition N, i.e.
M = N \ B(N). (19)
Definition 4. ∀pi ∈ M, let MWC1i be the collection of MWCs where the set of busy-1
players are A1(N) and player pi is a busy-2 player, i.e.
MWC1i = {C ∈ MWC : A1(C) = A1(N), pi ∈ A2(C)}. (20)
Obviously, when A1(N) is not winning, we have
MWC1 =
⋃
pi∈M
MWC1i. (21)
We claim that
|MWC1i| ≤ 1. (22)
In fact, MWC1i has only one potential member that is defined below.
Definition 5. We define C1i as the only potential member of MWC1i:
C1i = A1(N) ∪ {pi} ∪ D1i, (23)
where D1i is the set of “blocking” players in M whose first dimensions are too big that
C1i cannot afford to exclude, i.e.
D1i = {p j ∈ M : p1j + q2(N) ≥ p2i + q1(N)}. (24)
Notice it may be true that pi ∈ D1i. The lemma below show that whether C1i ∈
MWC1i can be checked very easily.
Lemma 7. In the two dimensional C-WMMG, ∀pi ∈ M, C1i ∈ MWC1i iff C1i is a
winning coalition and pi is both decisive and busy in C1i.
Proof. The necessary part is obvious, so we only need to show the sufficient part. As
C1i is winning and all its members are decisive, we have C1i ∈ MWC. Together with
pi is busy in C1i, we complete the proof. ⊓⊔
∀pi ∈ M, we can similarly define MWC2i = {C ∈ MWC : A2(C) = A2(N), pi ∈
A1(C)}, D2i = {p j ∈ M : p2j + q1(N) ≥ p1i + q2(N)}, C2i = A2(N) ∪ {pi} ∪ D2i, and have
parallel results.
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3.3 The upper-bound
Now we are ready to prove the main result of this section.
Theorem 1. In the two dimensional C-WMMG, |MWC| ≤ n + 1, and this bound is
tight.
Proof. In the case that A1(N) ∩ A2(N) , ∅, Lemma 3 implies the theorem. So we only
need to consider the case A1(N) ∩ A2(N) = ∅.
Let
T = {pi ∈ M : |MWC1i| = |MWC2i| = 1}. (25)
For arbitrary pi, p j ∈ T , we will show that p1i , p1j implies p2i = p2j . W.l.o.g. we
assume first that
p1i > p
1
j . (26)
Since p j ∈ T , we know by definition that MWC2 j , ∅, which further tells us that
its only possible member C2 j, as similarly defined in (23), is an MWC. Therefore, if
q1(N) + p2i ≥ q2(N) + p1j , then we would have pi ∈ D2 j, and consequently the fact that
p j is a busy-1 player of C2 j would imply that p1i ≤ p1j , contradicting assumption (26).
Hence we can only have
q1(N) + p2i < q2(N) + p1j . (27)
By a similar argument, pi ∈ T says that C1i is an MWC, containing pi as a busy-2
player. Inequality (27) tells us that p j ∈ D1i ⊂ C1i, and therefore
p2j ≤ p
2
i . (28)
Combining inequalities (26) (27) (28) we have
q1(N) + p2j < q2(N) + p1i . (29)
Again, p j ∈ T also implies that C1 j is an MWC containing p j as a busy-2 player.
Inequality (29) tells us that pi ∈ D1 j ⊂ C1 j, and hence p2i ≤ p2j , which, together with
inequality (28), gives p2i = p2j .
By symmetry we know that p2i , p2j implies p1i = p1j . It is not hard to check that
this can only happen when all the members in T have one identical dimension. W.l.o.g.
we assume that their second dimensions are the same.
For arbitrary pi, p j ∈ T , suppose that MWC1i ,MWC1 j, next we will show that
MWC2i =MWC2 j. Remember that
p2i = p
2
j . (30)
First of all, since MWC1i = {C1i},MWC1 j = {C1 j}, MWC1i ,MWC1 j means
that
C1i , C1 j. (31)
By definition (24), p2i = p2j implies that
D1i = D1 j. (32)
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We claim that p j < D1i, i.e.
p1j + q2(N) < p2i + q1(N). (33)
In fact, otherwise we would have C1 j ⊆ C1i, which would further imply C1 j = C1i,
because they are both MWCs. This contradicts (31).
From inequality (33), we immediate have pi ∈ D2 j ⊂ C2 j and further
p1i ≤ p
1
j , (34)
because pi ∈ T . Combining inequalities (30)(33)(34), we have
p1i + q2(N) < p2j + q1(N). (35)
Again, inequality (35) tells us that
p j ∈ D2i ⊂ C2i, (36)
and hence p1j ≤ p1i , which, together with (34), gives
p1i = p
1
j . (37)
By definition, (37) implies that D2i = D2 j, which, together with (36), further implies
that C2 j ⊆ C2i. Since C2i and C2 j are both MWCs, we get eventually C2i = C2 j.
According to the above discussion, either MWC1i =MWC1 j holds for all pi, p j ∈
T , or MWC2i =MWC2 j holds for all pi, p j ∈ T . Therefore,∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
⋃
p j∈T
(MWC1 j ∪MWC2 j)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ |T | + 1. (38)
For the case A1(N) is a winning coalition and the case A2(N) is a winning coalition,
the theorem is trivially true (Lemma 4). So we assume that q(A1(N)) < q(N \ A1(N))
and q(A2(N)) < q(N \ A2(N)). Therefore, MWC1 = ⋃p j∈M MWC1 j and MWC2 =⋃
p j∈M MWC2 j. Finally we have:
|MWC|
= |MWC1 ∪MWC2 ∪MWC3|
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
⋃
p j∈M
(MWC1 j ∪MWC2 j)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ + |MWC3|
≤
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
⋃
p j∈M\T
(MWC1 j ∪MWC2 j)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ +
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
⋃
p j∈T
(MWC1 j ∪MWC2 j)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ + m1 + m2
≤ (|M| − |T |) + (|T | + 1) + m1 + m2
= n + 1,
where the second last inequality is from Lemma 6, and the last inequality is from (38).
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The following example shows that the upper bound n + 1 is tight.
There are 4 kinds of players: (1) 4 huge players: p1 = p2 = (n2, 0), p3 = p4 = (0, n2);
(2) t − 1 left players: xt = (t, 0), xt−1 = (t − 1, 0), · · · , x2 = (2, 0); (3) t − 1 right players:
yt = (0, t), yt−1 = (0, t − 1), · · · , y2 = (0, 2); (4) 1 versatile player z = (1, 1).
It can be easily checked that A1(N) = {p1, p2}, A2(N) = {p3, p4}; |MWC3| =
2 + 2 = 4; For each of the left player x j, 2 ≤ j ≤ t, MWC1x j = ∅ and C2x j =
{p3, p4, x j, yt, yt−1, · · · , y j} ∈ MWC2; For each of the right players y j, 2 ≤ j ≤ t,
MWC2y j = ∅ and C1y j = {p1, p2, y j, xt, xt−1, · · · , x j} ∈ MWC1; For the versatile
player z, C1z = {z, p1, p2, xt, xt−1, · · · , x2} ∈ MWC1 and C2z = {z, p3, p4, yt, yt−1, · · · , y2}
∈ MWC2.
Therefore, there are n = 2t + 3 players and |MWC| = 4 + 2(t − 1) + 2 = n + 1. ⊓⊔
4 Local Monotonicity
In this section, we shall prove that local monotonicity, which says that players with
larger weights have no less power than the ones with smaller weights, holds for all the
four power indices in the two dimensional C-WMMG.
First of all, it is trivial that this property holds for the Penrose-Banzhaf index and
the Shapley-Shubik index (for arbitrary dimension, in fact). To verify that it also holds
for the Holler-Packel index and the Deegan-Packel index, we need two lemmas.
Lemma 8. In the two dimensional C-WMMG, for all C ∈ MWC, the following prop-
erties hold:
(a) ∀p j ∈ C, either p j is busy in C or p j is busy in C− ∪ {p j}. That is, p j ∈ B(C) ∪
B(C− ∪ {p j});
(b) If C has a benchwarmer, then either q1(C) < q1(C−) or q2(C) < q2(C−), and they
can’t hold simultaneously;
(c) If |A1(C)| ≥ 2 and A1(C) * A2(C), then either q1(C) ≤ q1(C−) or q2(C) ≤ q2(C−),
and they can’t hold simultaneously.
Proof. (a) If p j is a busy player of C, the proof is finished. Otherwise, C ∈ MWC
implies q(C) > q(C−) and q(C) = q(C \ {p j}) ≤ q(C− ∪ {p j}). Therefore, q(C− ∪ {p j}) >
q(C−), which means p j ∈ B(C− ∪ {p j}).
(b) Suppose that p j is a benchwarmer of C, then q(C) ≤ q(C− ∪ {p j}) and p j ∈
B(C− ∪ {p j}). Obviously, (p j, p j) < A(C− ∪ {p j}). Thus, either q(C) ≤ q1(C−) + p2j
or q(C) ≤ q2(C−) + p1j . Since q(C) = q1(C) + q2(C) and q1(C) > p1j , q2(C) > p2j ,
we have either q1(C) < q1(C−) or q2(C) < q2(C−). It is trivial that they can’t hold
simultaneously, since C is a winning coalition.
(c) Since |A1(C)| ≥ 2 and A1(C) * A2(C), we can take some p j ∈ A1(C) \ A2(C)
such that q(C \ {p j}) = q(C). As C ∈ MWC, we have q(C) ≤ q(C− ∪ {p j}) and
p j ∈ B(C− ∪ {p j}). Moreover, p j ∈ A1(C) \ A2(C) tells us that (p j, p j) < A(C− ∪ {p j}).
Thus, either q1(C)+q2(C) ≤ q1(N \C)+ p2j or q1(C)+q2(C) ≤ q2(C−)+ p1j). q1(C) ≥ p1j
and q2(C) ≥ p2j give that either q1(C) ≤ q1(C−) or q2(C) ≤ q2(C−). They can’t hold
simultaneously, because C is a winning coalition. ⊓⊔
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Lemma 9. In the two dimensional C-WMMG, take C1,C2 ∈ MWC. Suppose (pi0 , p j0) ∈
A(C1) ∩ A(C2), then C1 = C2 if one of the following conditions holds:
(a) |A(Ct)| = 1 for some t ∈ {1, 2}, i.e. A1(Ct) = {pi0 } and A2(Ct) = {p j0 };
(b) |At(C1)| = |At(C2)| = 1 for some t ∈ {1, 2}.
Proof. (a) Without loss of generality, we assume that t = 1. Suppose on the contrary that
C1 , C2, then C1 \ C2 , ∅ (note that no set can be a proper subset of the other because
they are both MWCs). Take some player pk0 ∈ C1 \ C2. Then pk0 is a benchwarmer of
C1 because pi0 and p j0 are the all busy players of C1. From Lemma 8(b), we know that
qk(C2) = qk(C1) < qk(C−1 ) f or some k ∈ {1, 2}. (39)
C1 is an MWC means that, for all p j ∈ Ak(C−1 ):
q({p j, pk0}) = qk(C−1 ) + p3−kk0 = q(C−1 ∪ {pk0 }) ≥ q(C1 \ {pk0}) = q(C2). (40)
As pk0 < C2 and C2 is a winning coalition, we have p j ∈ C2. Therefore Ak(C−1 ) ⊆ C2,
which further gives qk(C−1 ) ≤ qk(C2) and contradicts statement (39).
(b) Without loss of generality, we assume that t = 1. Therefore
A1(C1) = A1(C2) = {pi0 }. (41)
Suppose on the contrary that C1 , C2. Then C1 \C2 , ∅. Take any player
pk0 ∈ C1 \C2. (42)
If pk0 is a benchwarmer of C1, the proof is done by using the same argument as in
(a). So we assume that pk0 is a busy player of C1.
C1 ∈ MWC tells us that:
q(C−1 ∪ {pk0 }) ≥ q(C1 \ {pk0 }) = q(C1) = q(C2). (43)
If (pk0 , pk0 ) ∈ A(C−1 ∪ {pk0 }), we would have q({pk0}) ≥ q(C1), and further pk0 ∈
A1(C1) = {pi0 }, which contradicts (42). Therefore, there must exist some
w ∈ C−1 (44)
such that
q({w, pk0}) = q(C−1 ∪ {pk0 }) ≥ q(C2) = q(C1 ∪ C2). (45)
As pk0 < C2, from (45) we have
w ∈ C2, (46)
from the fact that C2 is a winning coalition.
Due to (42) (46), we have {w, pk0 } ⊆ C1 ∪C2. (45) implies further that q({w, pk0}) =
q(C1∪C2), hence either (w, pk0) ∈ A(C1∪C2) or (w, pk0) ∈ A(C1∪C2), and consequently
either w = pi0 or pk0 = pi0 . Clearly, w , pi0 (due to (41) and (44)), and pk0 , pi0 (41)
and (42)). A contradiction. ⊓⊔
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Theorem 2. In the two dimensional C-WMMG, local monotonicity holds for the Holler-
Packel index and the Deegan-Packel index. That is, for all pi0 , p j0 ∈ N, such that
pi0 ≤ p j0 , i.e. p1i0 ≤ p
1
j0 and p
2
i0 ≤ p
2
j0 , we have θi0 ≤ θ j0 for any θ ∈ {hp, dp}. In
particular, pi0 = p j0 implies θi0 = θ j0 .
Proof. We shall show that there exists at most one C ∈ MWC that consists of pi0 but
not p j0 , and if there does exist such C, we have at least one C∗ ∈ MWC that consists
of p j0 but not pi0 .
Suppose that C ∈ MWC, pi0 ∈ C and p j0 < C. By the definition of winning
coalitions, it is obvious that (C ∪ {p j0 }) \ {pi0 } is winning. By Lemma 1, there exists at
least one C∗ ∈ MWC such that C∗ ⊆ (C ∪ {p j0 }). It is straightforward that p j0 ∈ C∗,
pi0 < C∗ and 1/|C∗| ≥ 1/|C|. It suffices to show that there is at most one such C.
Suppose that there is still another C′ ∈ MWC such pi0 ∈ C
′
and p j0 < C
′
. pi0 ≤ p j0
implies that pi0 is a busy player in both C and C
′
, that is pi0 ∈ B(C) ∩ B(C
′). Without
loss of generality, we assume that pi0 ∈ A1(C). Since pi0 ≤ p j0 and p j0 < C, we have
further that A1(C) = {pi0 }, because otherwise pi0 would be indecisive to C.
We claim that pi0 ∈ A1(C
′ ) and thus A1(C′ ) = {pi0 }. Otherwise, we will have pi0 ∈
A2(C′ ) and thus A2(C′ ) = {pi0 }. Since pi0 ≤ p j0 and p j0 < C, it holds that (pi0 , pi0) <
A(C), there must exist some pk0 ∈ C such that (pi0 , pk0) ∈ A(c). Therefore q(C) =
q({pi0 , pk0 }). Similarly, there exists some p
′
k0 such that (p
′
k0 , pi0 ) ∈ A(C
′)) and q(C′) =
q({pi0 , p
′
k0 }). As p2k0 > p2i0 and p
′1
k0 > p
1
i0 , we have p
′
k0 < C and pk0 < C
′
. C is a winning
coalition tells us that
q({pi0 , pk0}) = q(C) > q(C−) ≥ q({p j0 , p
′
k0}) ≥ q({pi0 , p
′
k0 }). (47)
The last inequality holds because pi0 ≤ p j0 . As C
′ is also a winning coalition and
q(C′) = q({pi0 , p
′
k0}), we have
q({pi0 , p
′
k0) > q(C
′−) ≥ q({p j0 , pk0 }), (48)
which gives q({pi0 , pk0}) > q({p j0 , pk0}), a contradiction with pi0 ≤ p j0 .
As C is a winning coalition, pi0 ∈ A1(C) and pi0 ≤ p j0 imply that A2(C) = A2(N),
because otherwise C would not be winning. Since pi0 ∈ A1(C
′ ), for the same reason
we have A2(C′ ) = A2(N). Therefore, A2(C) = A2(C′ ). Together with A1(C) = A1(C′ ) =
{pi0 }, we finally get C = C
′ by Lemma 9(b).
As for the special case pi0 = p j0 , it is straightforward that θi0 = θ j0 since we have
both θi0 ≤ θ j0 and θ j0 ≤ θi0 . ⊓⊔
The following example shows that even if pi0 < p j0 , that is p1i0 < p
1
j0 and p
2
i0 < p
2
j0 ,
it is still possible that θ(pi0 ) = θ(p j0 ) for all θ ∈ {hp, dp, pb, ss}.
Example 2. There are four players in total: p1 = (10, 2), p2 = (2, 10), p3 = (1, 3), p4 =
(2, 4). p3 has only one MWC: {p1, p3}, p4 has only one MWC: {p1, p4}. Therefore hp3 =
hp4 = 1, and dp3 = dp4 = 1/2;
p3 has only one winning coalition in which she is decisive: {p1, p3}, p4 also has only
one winning coalition in which she is decisive: {p1, p4}. Therefore pb3 = pb4 = 1/8
and ss3 = ss4 = 1/12.
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The following example shows that a player who is busy in the grand coalition N,
that is a player in B(N), may have smaller power than that of a player who is not, if
powers are measured by Holler-Packel index or Deegan-Packel index.
Example 3. There are six players in total: p1 = (10, 0), p2 = (0, 10), p3 = p4 = p5 =
(0, 3), p6 = (3, 0). p2 has 2 MWCs: {p1, p2} and {p2, p3, p4, p5, p6}; p6 has 4 MWCs:
{p1, p3, p6}, {p1, p4, p6}, {p1, p5, p6} and {p2, p3, p4, p5, p6}. Therefore hp2 = 2 < hp6 =
4, and dp2 = 7/10 < dp6 = 6/5.
The example below shows that Theorem 2 doesn’t hold for the three or higher di-
mensional cases.
Example 4. There are five players in total: p1 = (5, 2, 1), p2 = (4, 0, 0), p3 = p4 =
(0, 2, 0), p5 = (0, 0, 4). p1 has 2 MWCs: {p1, p2} and {p1, p5}; p2 has 3 MWCs: {p1, p2},
{p2, p3, p5} and {p2, p4, p5}. Therefore hp1 = 2 < hp2 = 3, and dp1 = 1 < dp2 = 7/6,
while p1 > p2.
5 Concluding Remarks
C-WMMG is introduced in this paper. It models the complementary cooperation and
can be taken as a sister model of the famous weighted majority game. It is well known
that in continuous math, analysis that involves the operation of max is usually much
more complicated than that of addition because it is not differentiable. In combinatorial
optimization, the max form objective is also harder than that of sum form. In the field
of coalitional game theory, however, we see in this paper the opposite relation between
WMG and the two dimensional C-WMMG.
Since C-WMMG is a brand-new model, it is not surprising that, for further research,
there are lots of promising open problems. We only list a few that are to the most interest
of us.
(a) An obvious direction is to discuss the higher dimensional cases. It is meaning-
ful to analyze various other monotonicities. In particular, counter examples can easily
be constructed to show that new member monotonicity, which says that when a new
member enters into the game, normalized powers (original powers divided by the total
power) of initial players will not increase, is violated by all the four power indices. We
conjecture that the paradox of redistribution, which says that a player’s (normalized)
power may decrease when its weight increases, will not occur in any of the four power
indices. Whether an example similar to Example 3 exists for the Shapley-Shubik index
and Penrose-Banzhaf index is also an open question.
(b) The threshold variant of C-WMMG (TC-WMMG for short), where there is a
lower bound L such that v(C) = 1 if and only if q(C) ≥ L, is a more natural analogue
of WMMG and thus worth further study. In fact, it can be taken as a generalization of
C-WMMG, though it is difficult to give a clear value of the threshold such that TC-
WMMG with this threshold is exactly C-WMMG (recall the relation between WMG
and simple WMG as discussed in the second paragraph of Subsection 1.6). What’s
more, it is also a generalization of WMG. To be precise, the special case where the
dimension number d0 equals the number of players n and players have distinct nonzero
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dimensions is exactly WMG. The simplicity of a d0 dimensional TC-CWMMG is that
each MWC has at most d0 members (there are no benchwarmers in MWC). Hence
when d0 is a constant, the total number of MWCs can be bounded by O(nd0 ). When
d0 = 2, this bound is tight, being reached when half of the players are characterized
by (L/2, 0) and half by (0, L/2). As in WMG and C-WMMG, local monotonicity holds
trivially for the Shapley-Shubik index and Penrose-Banzhaf index. This is not true, how-
ever, for the Holler-Packel index and the Deegan-Packel index, because giant players
who can win by themselves may have smaller Holler-Packel and Deegan-Packel in-
dices than the versatile ones that have a great number of potential partners. For regular
TC-CWMMG where each MWC consists of exactly d0 players, we are happy to ob-
serve that local monotonicity always holds for the Holler-Packel index and the Deegan-
Packel index. Based on the upper-bound of MWC, efficient algorithms for computing
all the Holler-Packel and Deegan-Packel indices exist trivially. Computing Shapley-
Shubik and Penrose-Banzhaf indices, we guess, can also be done efficiently, though
careful analysis is still needed. Based on the above discussions, it seems that almost all
of the positive results for the two dimensional C-WMMG, presented in this paper, are
still valid for TC-WMMG with a constant dimension.
(c) Another interesting problem for TC-WMMG, which is not addressed for C-
WMMG (but already for WMG, see [13]), is to study the selfish behavior of players. To
be precise, assume that the value of each winning coalition is divided among its mem-
bers proportional to their contributions, study the price of anarchy under various equi-
librium or stability concepts. This problem, very interestingly, can be taken as a more
concrete model of the famous stable marriage problem (or more precisely, the stable
roommates problem), which is still actively studied today, see [29,75,40,41] for stan-
dard references, and [9,10,22,24,38,45,46,67,76] for recent works. A prominent feature
of the new model is that it is cardinal rather than ordinal, that is, players may get dif-
ferent payoffs by cooperating with different partners. There is not only a preference list
of each player for all her potential partners or partner sets, but also the exact payoffs.
We hope that this new ingredient may deepen the previous results of the stable marriage
problem as well as of the stable roommates problems, and bring brand-new interesting
properties and problems.
(d) The airport game is a classical model in cooperative game theory [8,53,54], and
is still attracting some new attention [4,39,32,33]. It has been well studied in real cases
of cost allocation of airport building. A prominent advantage of the airport game is that
the formidable Shapley value can be efficiently computed, as in the two dimensional
C-WMMG. In fact, it is the only nontrivial model, other than the two dimensional C-
WMMG and TC-WMMG (as discussed above in (b)), that possesses this property, as far
as known to the authors. Interestingly, if we simply define the cost function as c(C) =
q(C) = ∑d0i=1 max{pij : p j ∈ C}, we can find that the cost sharing cooperative game
model (c(·), N) is exactly the high dimensional version of the airport game. We hope
that this new model can find good applications just like the airport game.
(d) An interesting variant of C-WMMG is the model where in any coalitional struc-
ture there are more than one coalitions that can get a nonzero payoff, say besides the
winner, there is also a runner-up (we can either assume that the two coalitions get identi-
cal payoffs, or assume that the winner gets more than the runner-up). Coalitional games
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with externalities, also known as the partition function form as compared with the char-
acteristic form [55], are very meaningful models that are attracting more and more
attention both from the field of game theory, and from the field of supply chain man-
agement. To represent a general partition function form coalitional game, it is even more
difficult than that of a characteristic form one, where there are 2n number of coalitional
values (to be exact, the number of coalitional structures in a general partition function
form coalitional game, for each of which a certain number of values should be assigned,
is called Stirling number of the second kind. Needless to say, it is extremely huge). This
is one of the main barriers for in-depth study of this model. And in contrast to the clas-
sical characteristic form, where there have been lots of very famous, and well studied
and well applied, concrete models, very few is known to the partition function form.
The new model we just proposed, we hope, may be helpful at least in part in solving
the above two problems.
(f) Cooperation rule that is not purely complementary as displayed in the example
of producing two goods in Subsection 1.1, i.e. each player is restricted to play at most
one role, is also of great interest. In fact, there exists quite a few natural and interesting
cooperation rules, see [12] for a tentative study.
(g) Computing other cooperative solutions for C-WMMG, say the nucleolus, the
kernel, the least core, and various bargaining sets, are also meaningful. We remind the
reader that these problems have already been considered for WMG [19,20,30].
(h) The inverse power index problems for WMG, i.e. given a certain power index
and a distribution on players, compute a WMG instance that has a distribution of power
indices that is as close as possible to the given distribution, began to attract researchers’
attention recently [3,15,45,47]. This is, in some sense, the ultimate goal for the research
of power index measuring. Finding that players’ real bargaining powers in voting may
not be proportional to their direct voting weights and conceiving more scientific mea-
suring ways is only a first step. The second, and probably the final, step is to design
better voting mechanisms or find better vote allocating ways. This branch of research,
doubtlessly, is likely to be even more controversial than power measuring, because it is
extremely hard for people to agree on what fairness is. Regardlessly of this, we believe
that the inverse problem is a promising new direction that is worth more serious atten-
tion. Various inverse problems for C-WMMG, of course, are also meaningful. Since the
two dimensional C-WMMG is much more handleable than WMG, we expect that its
inverse problems will also be easier. Due to this feature, we can construct a new voting
mechanism where each vote is characterized by a vector and pooling more than one
votes is not adding them together, but to take a maximum for each dimension. Although
this new voting mechanism may seem rather weird at the first glance, and honestly, we
have completely no idea whether taxpayers might accept it one day or another, we hope
that it may be useful in some really special scenarios.
(i) Although complementary cooperation is an extremely popular phenomenon, as
argued in the introduction part of this paper, the first possible applications and case
studies of C-WMMG are likely to come from team sports, because the cooperation of
players in team sports is largely pure complementary, and evaluation of players (and
benchwarmers in particular) is also meaningful in both theory and practice. This topic
falls into the fields of contest theory, and more generally sports economics [14,35,73].
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For instance, our theory, along with more future in-depth studies, may help people rank
the NBA players, evaluate the benchwarmers, and select the MVP more objectively.
We know that NBA player trading is a huge market, our theory may also be helpful in
advising team managers on how to trade players more efficiently.
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A Computing MWCs
Due to the analysis in Section 3, an O(n2) algorithm for computing all the MWCs can
be simply designed by brute-force enumeration. We show in this section that the time
complexity can be reduced to O(n log n). We need to deal with the data structure more
carefully. All the notations in Section 3 are still valid in this section.
As shown in Lemma 3 and Lemma 4, the case A1(N) ∩ A2(N) , ∅ and the cases
A1(N) is winning or A2(N) is winning are very simple, so we concentrate on the case
where A1(N) ∩ A2(N) = ∅ and neither A1(N) nor A2(N) is winning.
Remember that M is the set of benchwarmers of the grand coalition N. Let m be the
cardinality of M, i.e.
m = |M|, (49)
and re-index all the players in M as p1, p2, · · · , pm in non-increasing order of their first
dimensions, i.e.
p11 ≥ p
1
2 ≥ · · · ≥ p
1
m. (50)
Definition 6. For each player pi ∈ M, we give her a second index l(i), 1 ≤ l(i) ≤ m.
We also assume that the second indices are in non-increasing order of their second
dimensions, i.e.
p2l−1(1) ≥ p
2
l−1(2) ≥ · · · ≥ p
2
l−1(m), (51)
where pl−1(i) denotes the player in M whose second index is i.
Given pi ∈ M, suppose D1i is non-empty, then players in D1i have consecutive
indices. To be exact, we need a new notation.
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Definition 7. ∀pi ∈ M, we use x(i) to denote the largest index of players in D1i, i.e.
x(i) = max
{
j : p j ∈ D1i
}
. (52)
Then we have
D1i =
{
p j : 1 ≤ j ≤ x(i)
}
. (53)
Therefore, D1i is nicely determined by x(i). If D1i = ∅, we simply let x(i) = 0.
Similarly,
Definition 8. ∀pi ∈ M, we use let y(i) to denote the largest second index of players in
D2i, i.e.
y(i) = max
{
l( j) : p j ∈ D2i
}
. (54)
Then we have
D2i =
{
pl−1( j) : 1 ≤ j ≤ y(i)
}
. (55)
And if D2i = ∅, we let y(i) = 0.
By definitions of D1i, D2i, and the two indexings, the following inclusion relations
are obvious:
D1l−1(1) ⊆ D1l−1(2) ⊆ · · · ⊆ D1l−1(m), (56)
D21 ⊆ D22 ⊆ · · · ⊆ D2m. (57)
And equivalently:
x(l−1(1)) ≤ x(l−1(2)) ≤ · · · ≤ x(l−1(m)), (58)
y(1) ≤ y(2) ≤ · · · ≤ y(m). (59)
Due to the above monotone relations, and the fact that they are all integers falling
into the interval [0,m], x(i)s and y(i)s can be computed easily in O(m) time. We omit
the details. And hence the D1is, D2is, C1is and C2is can be computed in O(m) time.
The remaining problem is to show that checking which of such coalitions are MWCs
and which are not can be done in O(m log m). Notice that checking them one by one in-
dependently cannot be efficient enough. The main idea is also to do some pre-treatments.
To be precise, we need several more notations.
Definition 9. ∀pi ∈ M, we use R1(i) and r1(i) to denote the smallest second index and
second smallest second index of the players {p1, p2, · · · , pi}, respectively, i.e.
R1(i) = min
{
l( j) : 1 ≤ j ≤ i
}
, (60)
r1(i) = min
{
l( j) : 1 ≤ j ≤ i, l( j) , R1(i)
}
. (61)
Definition 10. ∀pi ∈ M, we use µ1i to denote the indicator of whether pi ∈ D1i and has
the largest second dimension, i.e.
µ1i =
{
1 i f l(i) = R1(x(i))
0 otherwise . (62)
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Then it can be checked that
q2
(
D1i \ {pi}
)
= (1 − µ1i)p2l−1(R1(x(i))) + µ1i p
2
l−1(r1(x(i))). (63)
The advantage of the R1(i)s and r1(i)s is that they can be computed in O(m) time,
using simple algorithmic techniques.
Similarly, ∀pi ∈ M, let R2(i) and r2(i) be the smallest index and second smallest
index of the players
{
pl−1(1), pl−1(2), · · · , pl−1(i)
}
, respectively, i.e.
R2(i) = min
{
j : 1 ≤ l( j) ≤ i
}
, (64)
r2(i) = min
{
j : 1 ≤ l( j) ≤ i, j , R2(i)
}
. (65)
R2(i)s and r2(i)s can also be computed in O(m) time. ∀pi ∈ M, let µ2i be the indicator
of whether pi ∈ D2i and has the largest first dimension, i.e.
µ2i =
{
1 i f i = R2(y(i))
0 otherwise , (66)
then it can be checked that
q1
(
D2i \ {pi}
)
= (1 − µ2i)p1R2(y(i)) + µ2i p1r2(y(i)). (67)
Analogous to Lemma 7, we have the following more concrete result.
Lemma 10. In the two dimensional C-WMMG, ∀pi ∈ M, C1i ∈MWC1i iff the follow-
ing three conditions hold simultaneously:
p2i ≥ max
{
p2l−1(R1(x(i))), q2(A1(N))
}
, (68)
q1(N) + p2i > q2(N) + max
{
q1(A2(N)), p1x(i)+1
}
, (69)
q1(N) + max
{
q2
(
D1i \ {pi}
)
, q2(A1(N))
}
≤ q2(N) + max
{
q1(A2(N)), p1x(i)+1, p1i
}
, (70)
where p1
m+1 is defined as 0.
Proof. Condition (68) means that pi is busy-2 in C1i; Condition (69) guarantees that C1i
is winning; Condition (70) says pi is decisive in C1i. ⊓⊔
The above lemma tells us that to determine whether C1i ∈ MWC1i or not takes
constant time (recall (63)). Similar result holds for C2i.
A valuable notice is that, for any pi, p j ∈ M, pi , p j, even if C1i ∈ MWC1i and
C1 j ∈ MWC1 j, it is still possible that C1i = C1 j. If this situation occurs, it must hold
that p2i = p
2
j . The following lemma shows that eliminating the redundant coalitions can
be done efficiently.
Lemma 11. In the two dimensional C-WMMG, suppose that p2l−1(i) = p
2
l−1(i+1) = · · · =
p2l−1( j), 1 ≤ i < j ≤ m, and C1l−1(t) ∈ MWC1l−1(t) for all i ≤ t ≤ j. By definition (24), it
can be observed that all the D1l−1(t)s are the same. We denote them as D.
(a) If pl−1(i) ∈ D, then C1l−1(i) = C1l−1(i+1) = · · · = C1l−1( j).
(b) If pl−1(i) < D, then C1l−1(s) , C1l−1(t) holds for all i ≤ s, t ≤ j, s , t.
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Proof. (a) ∀i < s ≤ j, we know by hypothesis that C1l−1(i) ⊆ C1l−1(s). Since the two
coalitions are both MWCs, they can only be identical.
(b) Suppose on the contrary that C1l−1(s) = C1l−1(t) for some s , t. This implies that
pl−1(t) ∈ D. Using a similar argument as in (a), we have C1l−1(i) = C1l−1(i+1) = · · · =
C1l−1( j), and hence pl−1(i) ∈ D, a contradiction with the hypothesis. ⊓⊔
According to the above discussions,MWC1 andMWC2 can be computed in O(m)
time. Since computingMWC3 is easy (Lemma 5), the algorithm for computing all the
MWCs can be easily designed. The algorithm is described as follows.
Algorithm MWC-2
step 1. Input N;
Compute A1(N), A2(N), as well as q1(N), q2(N), q1(A2(N)) and q2(A1(N));
if A1(N) ∩ A2(N) , ∅
if A1(N) ⊆ A2(N)
output A1(N)
elseif A2(N) ⊂ A1(N)
output A2(N)
else
output
{
A1(N), A2(N)
}
and stop;
endif
step 2. Re-index all the players in M and calculate all the l( j)s as in (50) and (51);
step 3. Compute all the x(i)s and y(i)s for all pi ∈ M;
step 4. Compute all the R1(i)s, r1(i)s, R2(i)s and r2(i)s for all pi ∈ M;
step 5. For each pi ∈ M, check if C1i and C2i are MWCs;
step 6. Eliminate the redundant coalitions in MWC1 and MWC2;
step 7. Output MWC.
Theorem 3. MWC can be computed in O(n log n) time.
Proof. Step 1 can be done in O(n) time. According to the sorting theory which can be
found in any algorithm design book, step 2 can be done in O(m log m). According to our
previous discussions, step 3 and step 4 can be done in O(m) time. According to Lemma
10, step 5 can be done in O(m) time. Lemma 11 tells us that step 6 can be done in O(m)
time. Since MWC is the union of MWC1, MWC2 and MWC3, according to (16)
and the above discussion, step 7 can be done in O(n) time. In sum, the time complexity
of Algorithm MWC-2 is O(n log n) time (note m < n). ⊓⊔
B Computing Holler-Packel and Deegan-Packel indices
As the Holler-Packel and Deegan-Packel indices are directly determined by MWC,
computing them is routine. The main concern is still a careful treatment of the data
structure, because computing the indices one by one independently is quite inefficient.
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B.1 Holler-Packel indices
As in the preceding section, we discuss the easier cases first. Due to Lemma 3, the
following theorem is obvious.
Theorem 4. In the two dimensional C-WMMG, suppose A1(N) ∩ A2(N) , ∅.
(a) When A1(N) = A2(N):
hpi =
{
1 i f pi ∈ A1(N)
0 i f pi ∈ M ; (71)
(b1) When A1(N) ⊂ A2(N):
hpi =
{
1 i f pi ∈ A1(N)
0 i f pi ∈ N \ A1(N) ; (72)
(b2) When A2(N) ⊂ A1(N):
hpi =
{
1 i f pi ∈ A2(N)
0 i f pi ∈ N \ A2(N) ; (73)
(c) Otherwise:
hpi =

2 i f pi ∈ A1(N) ∩ A2(N)
1 i f pi ∈ B(N) \ (A1(N) ∩ A2(N))
0 i f pi ∈ M
. (74)
Due to Lemma 4, the following theorem is also easy.
Theorem 5. In the two dimensional C-WMMG, suppose A1(N) ∩ A2(N) = ∅.
(a1) When A1(N) is a winning coalition and m1 = 1:
hpi =
{
1 i f pi ∈ A1(N)
0 i f pi ∈ A2(N) ∪ M ; (75)
(b1) When A1(N) is a winning coalition and m1 > 1:
hpi =

2 i f pi ∈ A1(N)
m1 i f pi ∈ A2(N)
0 i f pi ∈ M
; (76)
(a2) When A2(N) is a winning coalition and m2 = 1:
hpi =
{
1 i f pi ∈ A2(N)
0 i f pi ∈ A1(N) ∪ M ; (77)
(b2) When A2(N) is a winning coalition and m2 > 1:
hpi =

m2 i f pi ∈ A1(N)
2 i f pi ∈ A2(N)
0 i f pi ∈ M
. (78)
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Now, let’s discuss the most complicated case. We need two additional symbols.
Definition 11. We use n1 and n2 to denote the number of coalitions in MWC1 and
MWC2, respectively, i.e.
|MWC1| = n1, (79)
|MWC2| = n2. (80)
We suppose that
MWC1 =
{
C1l−1(u1),C1l−1(u2), · · · ,C1l−1(un1 )
}
, (81)
MWC2 =
{
C2v1 ,C2v2 , · · · ,C2vn2
}
, (82)
where pl−1(us) ∈ M, pvt ∈ M,∀1 ≤ s ≤ n1, 1 ≤ t ≤ n2, and
u1 < u2 < · · · < un1 , (83)
v1 < v2 < · · · < vn2 . (84)
Definition 12. ∀pi ∈ M, we use τ1i to denote the index of the first coalition in (81) that
the corresponding D contains pi, i.e.
τ1i = min
{
j : 1 ≤ j ≤ n1, i ≤ x(l−1(u j))}. (85)
Similarly, we define
τ2i = min
{
j : 1 ≤ j ≤ n2, i ≤ y(v j)
}
. (86)
Definition 13. ∀pi ∈ M, we use ̺1i to denote the indicator of whether pi < D1i, i.e.
̺1i =
{
1 i f i > x(i)
0 otherwise . (87)
Definition 14. ∀pi ∈ M, we use σ1i to denote the indicator of whether i ∈
{
l−1(u1), l−1(u2), · · · , l−1(un1 )
}
and pi < D1i, i.e.
σ1i =
1 i f i ∈
{
l−1(u1), l−1(u2), · · · , l−1(un1)
}
& ̺1i = 1
0 otherwise
. (88)
Similarly, for all pi ∈ M, we define
̺2i =
{
1 i f l(i) > y(i)
0 otherwise , (89)
and
σ2i =
{
1 i f i ∈ {v1, v2 · · · , vn2 } & ̺2i = 1
0 otherwise . (90)
Recall that m1 = |A1(N)|,m2 = |A2(N)| as defined in Section 3. The formulas for
calculating Holler-Packel indices in the most complicated case are as follows.
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Theorem 6. In the two dimensional C-WMMG, suppose A1(N)∩A2(N) = ∅ and neither
A1(N) nor A2(N) is winning.
(a1) For pi ∈ A1(N):
hpi =

n1 + 1 i f m2 = 1
n1 + m2 i f m1 = 1
n1 + m2 + 1 i f m2 > 1,m1 > 1
; (91)
(a2) For pi ∈ A2(N):
hpi =

n2 + 1 i f m1 = 1
n2 + m1 i f m2 = 1
n2 + m1 + 1 i f m1 > 1,m2 > 1
; (92)
(b) For pi ∈ M:
hpi =
∑
k=1,2
(
nk − τki + 1 + σki
)
. (93)
Proof. ∀pi ∈ A1(N). Obviously, all the n1 MWCs in MWC1 contain pi. (i) If m2 = 1,
then by Lemma 5, {pi} ∪ A2(N) is the only MWC in MWC3 that contains pi. The
hypothesis A1(N) ∩ A2(N) = ∅ tells us that none of the coalitions in MWC2 contains
pi. Therefore in this case hpi = n1+1. (ii) If m1 = 1, then by Lemma 5, the set of MWCs
in MWC3 that contains pi is
{
A1(N) ∪ {p j} : p j ∈ A2(N)
}
, whose cardinality is m2.
Hence in this case hpi = n1 + m2. (iii) If m1 > 1 and m2 > 1, then by Lemma 5, the set
of MWCs in MWC3 that contains pi is
{
A1(N)∪ {p j} : p j ∈ A2(N)
}
∪
{
{pi} ∪ {A2(N)}
}
,
whose cardinality is m2 + 1. Hence in this case hpi = n1 + m2 + 1. Based on the above
discussion, (a1) is valid. (a2) can be shown to be true in the same way. We are left to
show (b).
From (56)(57)(83)(84), we observe that
C1l−1(us) \C1l−1(ut) =
{
pl−1(us)
}
,∀1 ≤ s < t ≤ n1. (94)
By (56)(83) and the definition (85), we know that n1 − τ1i + 1 is the number of
coalitions in MWC1 whose corresponding D contains pi. Recall the definition (23),
we know by definition (88) and observation (94) that there is at most one coalition in
MWC1 that contain pi as the busy-2 player. This coalition has an extra contribution to
the power indices iff i ∈
{
l−1(u1), l−1(u2), · · · , l−1(un1)
}
and pi < D1i. By definition, σ1i
is the indicator. Therefore, n1−τ1i +1+σ1i is the total number of coalitions in MWC1
that contain pi. Parallely, n2 − τ2i + 1 +σ2i is the total number of coalitions in MWC2
that contain pi. Since there is no coalition in MWC3 that contains pi, (b) is true. ⊓⊔
B.2 Deegan-Packel indices
Similar to Theorem 4, Theorem 5 and Theorem 6, we have the following formulas for
calculating Deegan-Packel indices, whose proofs are quite similar to those of Holler-
Packel indices and thus are omitted. We only need to notice that
|C1i| = m1 + x(i) + ̺1i, (95)
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and
|C2i| = m2 + y(i) + ̺2i. (96)
Theorem 7. In the two dimensional C-WMMG, suppose A1(N) ∩ A2(N) , ∅.
(a) When A1(N) = A2(N):
dpi =
{ 1
m1
i f pi ∈ A1(N)
0 i f pi ∈ M ; (97)
(b1) When A1(N) ⊂ A2(N):
dpi =
{ 1
m1
i f pi ∈ A1(N)
0 i f pi ∈ N \ A1(N) ; (98)
(b2) When A2(N) ⊂ A1(N):
dpi =
{ 1
m2
i f pi ∈ A2(N)
0 i f pi ∈ N \ A2(N) ; (99)
(c) Otherwise:
hpi =

1
m1
+ 1
m2
i f pi ∈ A1(N) ∩ A2(N)
1
m1
i f pi ∈ A1(N) \ A2(N)
1
m2
i f pi ∈ A2(N) \ A1(N)
0 i f pi ∈ M
. (100)
Theorem 8. In the two dimensional C-WMMG, suppose A1(N) ∩ A2(N) = ∅.
(a1) When A1(N) is a winning coalition and m1 = 1:
dpi =
{
1 i f pi ∈ A1(N)
0 i f pi ∈ A2(N) ∪ M ; (101)
(b1) When A1(N) is a winning coalition and m1 > 1:
dpi =

1
m1
+ 1
m2+1 i f pi ∈ A1(N)
m1
m2+1 i f pi ∈ A2(N)
0 i f pi ∈ M
; (102)
(a2) When A2(N) is a winning coalition and m2 = 1:
dpi =
{
1 i f pi ∈ A2(N)
0 i f pi ∈ A1(N) ∪ M ; (103)
(b2) When A2(N) is a winning coalition and m2 > 1:
dpi =

m2
m1+1 i f pi ∈ A1(N)1
m2
+ 1
m1+1 i f pi ∈ A2(N)
0 i f pi ∈ M
. (104)
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Theorem 9. In the two dimensional C-WMMG, suppose A1(N)∩A2(N) = ∅ and neither
A1(N) nor A2(N) is winning.
(a1) For pi ∈ A1(N):
dpi =

1
2 +
∑n1
s=1
1
m1+x
(
l−1(us)
)
+̺1l−1(us)
i f m2 = 1
m2
m1+1 +
∑n1
s=1
1
m1+x
(
l−1(us)
)
+̺1l−1(us)
i f m1 = 1
m2
m1+1 +
1
m2+1 +
∑n1
s=1
1
m1+x
(
l−1(us)
)
+̺1l−1(us)
i f m2 > 1,m1 > 1
; (105)
(a2) For pi ∈ A2(N):
dpi =

1
2 +
∑n2
s=1
1
m2+y(vs)+̺2vs i f m1 = 1
m1
m2+1 +
∑n2
s=1
1
m2+y(vs)+̺2vs i f m2 = 1
m1
m2+1 +
1
m1+1 +
∑n2
s=1
1
m2+y(vs)+̺2vs i f m1 > 1,m2 > 1
; (106)
(b) For pi ∈ M:
dpi =
n1∑
s=τ1i
1
m1 + x
(l−1(us)) + ̺1l−1(us) +
n2∑
s=τ2i
1
m2 + y(vs) + ̺2vs
(107)
+
σ1i
m1 + x(i) + 1 +
σ2i
m2 + y(i) + 1 . (108)
B.3 Summary result
Theorem 10. After computing MWC, computing all the Holler-Packel indices can be
done in O(n) time, and computing all the Deegan-Packel indices can be done in O(n2)
time.
Proof. We only need to discuss the most complicated case. Due to (58)(59) and (83)(84),
computing τ1is and τ2is can be done in O(m) time. All the other necessary parameters
can obviously be computed in O(m) time. By Theorem 6, computing all the Holler-
Packel indices can be done in O(n) time. By Theorem 1 and Theorem 9, we know that
each Deegan-Packel index can be computed in O(n) time, and so computing all the
Deegan-Packel indices can be done in O(n2) time. ⊓⊔
C Computing WCs
The role of this section is three-folded. First, we want to show that, in the two di-
mensional C-WMMG, although the number of winning coalitions may be huge, the
structure is relatively simple, i.e. we can “describe” WC in polynomial time. This re-
sult obviously has its own interest. Second, we want to do some analysis aboutWC(i)s,
which will be used in the next section. Unlike Holler-Packel and Deegan-Packel in-
dices, which are based on MWC, Penrose-Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik indices rely
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on WC(i)s. To compute the latter two power indices, we should first analyze the struc-
ture of WC(i)s. The analysis of WC(i)s, however, is not complete, because we shall
only consider the cases that are by-products of computing WC. The relatively separa-
ble cases will be postponed to the next section. Third, the main ideas and notations for
analyzing WC will also be used in the next section.
Definition 15. Similar to the way we dealt with MWC, we divide WC into three sub-
collections:
WC1 =
{
C ∈ WC : A1(N) ⊆ C, A2(N) ∩ C = ∅
}
, (109)
WC2 =
{
C ∈ WC : A2(N) ⊆ C, A1(N) ∩ C = ∅
}
, (110)
WC3 =
{
C ∈ WC : A1(N) ∩ C , ∅, A2(N) ∩ C , ∅
}
. (111)
Definition 16. ∀pi ∈ N, we use WC3(i) to denote the set of winning coalitions in
WC3 that contain pi as a decisive player, i.e.
WC3(i) =
{
C ∈ WC3 : C ∋ pi,C \ {pi} <WC
}
. (112)
Lemma 12. In the two dimensional C-WMMG, ∀pi ∈ M, we have WC3(i) = ∅.
Proof. For any C ∈ WC3 that contains pi ∈ M, we have q(C) = q(N) and the leaving
of pi will not change q(C) at all. At the same time, we also have q(C− ∪ {pi}) < q(N).
Therefore, pi is not decisive in any C ∈ WC3 and hence the lemma. ⊓⊔
C.1 The simple cases
Lemma 13. In the two dimensional C-WMMG, if A1(N) ∩ A2(N) , ∅, then
(a) WC1 =WC2 = ∅;
(b) ∀pi ∈ A1(N) ∪ A2(N):
WC3(i) =

{
A1(N) ∪C ∪ D : C ⊂ A2(N) \ A1(N), D ⊆ M
}
⋃ {
A2(N) ∪C ∪ D : C ⊂ A1(N) \ A2(N), D ⊆ M
}
⋃ {
A1(N) ∪ A2(N) ∪ D : D ⊆ M
}
i f pi ∈ A1(N) ∩ A2(N){
A1(N) ∪C ∪ D : C ⊂ A2(N) \ A1(N), D ⊆ M
}
i f pi ∈ A1(N) \ A2(N){
A2(N) ∪C ∪ D : C ⊂ A1(N) \ A2(N), D ⊆ M
}
i f pi ∈ A2(N) \ A1(N)
, (113)
and the three families in the first case are disjoint;
(c)
WC3 =
{
A1(N) ∪ C ∪ D : C ⊂ A2(N) \ A1(N), D ⊆ M
}
(114)
∪
{
A2(N) ∪C ∪ D : C ⊂ A1(N) \ A2(N), D ⊆ M
}
(115)
∪
{
A1(N) ∪ A2(N) ∪ D : D ⊆ M
}
. (116)
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Proof. Since A1(N) ∩ A2(N) , ∅, WC1 = WC2 = ∅ is straightforward. (c) is an
immediate result of (b) and Lemma 12. We are left to show that (b) is correct. First of
all, coalitions that either include A1(N) or A2(N) are all in WC3.
In the case that pi ∈ A1(N)∩A2(N), pi is contained in each of these coalitions and is
always decisive. The union of the three families in formula (113), which are evidently
disjoint, is exactly the whole set of these coalitions.
Let’s consider now the case pi ∈ A1(N) \ A2(N). First of all, A1(N) \ A2(N) , ∅
implies that A1(N) * A2(N). Suppose C(i) is a coalition in WC3(i), then by Lemma 2,
we know that either A1(N) ⊆ C(i) or A2(N) ⊆ C(i). We claim that A2(N) * C(i). In fact,
if A2(N) ⊆ C(i), we would have q((N \ C(i)) ∪ {pi}) < q(N) = q(C(i) \ {pi}) and hence
pi would be indecisive in C(i), contradicting our hypothesis. Therefore we have
A1(N) ⊆ C(i). (117)
Further, we must have (
N \C(i)
)
∩ A2(N) , ∅, (118)
because otherwise pi would be indecisive in C(i). Combining (117)(118),we can easily
check that
{
A1(N) ∪ C ∪ D : C ⊂ A2(N) \ A1(N), D ⊆ M
}
is exactly WC3(i). So the
second case is valid, and hence the third case by symmetry. ⊓⊔
Notice that when A1(N) ⊆ A2(N), WC3(i) = ∅ holds for all pi ∈ A2(N) \ A1(N).
This is embodied is Lemma 13. Similar result holds for pi ∈ A1(N) \ A2(N) when
A2(N) ⊆ A1(N).
Lemma 14. In the two dimensional C-WMMG, suppose A1(N) ∩ A2(N) = ∅.
(a1) When A1(N) is a winning coalition and m1 = 1:
WC(i) =

{
A1(N) ∪ C : C ⊆ A2(N) ∪ M
}
i f pi ∈ A1(N)
∅ i f pi ∈ A2(N) ∪ M
, (119)
WC =
{
A1(N) ∪ C : C ⊆ A2(N) ∪ M
}
; (120)
(b1) When A1(N) is a winning coalition and m1 > 1:
WC(i) =

{
A1(N) ∪ C ∪ D : C ⊂ A2(N), D ⊆ M
}
⋃ {
A2(N) ∪ {pi} ∪ D : D ⊆ M
}
i f pi ∈ A1(N){
A2(N) ∪ C ∪ D : ∅ ⊂ C ⊂ A1(N), D ⊆ M
}
i f pi ∈ A2(N)
∅ i f pi ∈ M
, (121)
WC =
{
A1(N) ∪ C ∪ D : C ⊂ A2(N), D ⊆ M
}
(122)
∪
{
A2(N) ∪C ∪ D : ∅ ⊂ C ⊂ A1(N), D ⊆ M
}
; (123)
(a2) When A2(N) is a winning coalition and m2 = 1:
WC(i) =

{
A2(N) ∪ C : C ⊆ A1(N) ∪ M
}
i f pi ∈ A2(N)
∅ i f pi ∈ A1(N) ∪ M
, (124)
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WC =
{
A2(N) ∪ C : C ⊆ A1(N) ∪ M
}
; (125)
(b2) When A2(N) is a winning coalition and m2 > 1:
WC(i) =

{
A1(N) ∪ C ∪ D : ∅ ⊂ C ⊂ A2(N), D ⊆ M
}
i f pi ∈ A1(N){
A2(N) ∪ C ∪ D : C ⊂ A1(N), D ⊆ M
}
⋃ {
A1(N) ∪ {pi} ∪ D : D ⊆ M
}
i f pi ∈ A2(N)
∅ i f pi ∈ M
, (126)
WC =
{
A2(N) ∪C ∪ D : C ⊂ A1(N), D ⊆ M
}
(127)
∪
{
A1(N) ∪ C ∪ D : ∅ ⊂ C ⊂ A2(N), D ⊆ M
}
. (128)
Proof. Since (a2) is symmetric to (a1), and (b2) is symmetric to (b1). It is sufficient to
show that (a1) and (b1) are correct.
(a1) Since A1(N) is a winning coalition and has only one member, we know that
any coalition that contains her is winning, and any coalition that fails to contain her is
losing, and no other player in a winning coalition is decisive. So (119) and (120) are
correct;
(b1) ∀X ∈ WC(i), due to Lemma 2, either A1(N) ⊆ X or A2(N) ⊆ X. By hypothesis,
any coalition include A1(N) is winning.
(i) Suppose first pi ∈ A1(N). When A1(N) ⊆ X, if we still have A2(N) ⊆ X, then pi
would not be decisive in X, because we would have
q(X \ {pi}) = q(N) > q((N \ X) ∪ {pi}), (129)
where the equality is true because there are at least two players in A1(N), and the in-
equality is true because q2
((N \ X) ∪ {pi}) < q2(N) (notice that the hypothesis A1(N) ∩
A2(N) is used). Therefore it must be true that A2(N) * X. When A2(N) ⊆ X, we must
have X ∩ A1(N) = {pi}, because if there is a second player p j ∈ X ∩ A1(N), we would
have
q(X \ {pi}) = q(N) > q((N \ X) ∪ {pi}), (130)
where the equality is true because the existence of p j, and the inequality is true because
q1
((N \ X) ∪ {pi}) < q1(N) (notice again that the hypothesis A1(N) ∩ A2(N) is used). It
can be checked trivially that all the coalitions in the formula are in WC(i), and hence
the formula in case is correct.
(ii) Suppose now pi ∈ A2(N). First, it cannot be true that A1(N) ⊆ X, because
otherwise pi would not be decisive (notice that A1(N) is winning). Consequently, it
must hold that A2(N) ⊆ X. To be winning, X must contain at least one member of
A1(N). Due to the above analysis, it can be checked that the formula in this case is also
true.
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(iii) Suppose now pi ∈ M. If A1(N) ⊆ X, then pi would not be decisive, because
A1(N) alone is winning. So we must have A2(N) ⊆ X. To be winning, X must also
contain at least one member of A1(N). Consequently we have
q(X \ {pi}) = q(N) > q((N \ X) ∪ {pi}), (131)
a contradiction with the assumption that pi is decisive in X. It can only be that such X
does not exist at all, i.e. WC(i) = ∅.
Noticing that the set in the second line of (121) is a subset of that in the third line,
the formula for WC can be easily checked to be true. ⊓⊔
C.2 The complex case
We are left to discuss the most complicated case, i.e. the case that A1(N) ∩ A2(N) = ∅
and neither A1(N) nor A2(N) is winning.
Definition 17. ∀pi ∈ M, we denote WC1i as the set of winning coalitions in WC1
such that player pi is busy-2 (but not necessarily decisive), i.e.
WC1i =
{
C ∈ WC : A1(C) = A1(N), pi ∈ A2(C)
}
. (132)
Obviously, when A1(N) ∩ A2(N) = ∅ and A1(N) is not winning:
WC1 =
⋃
pi∈M
WC1i. (133)
Definition 18. ∀pi ∈ M1, let W1i be the subset of winning coalitions in WC1i that are
minimal, i.e.
W1i =
{
C ∈ WC1i : C \ {p j} <WC,∀p j ∈ C \ {pi}
}
. (134)
Recall the definitions of C1i and D1i in (23) and (24) of Section 3. Then using the
same argument as in (23) we know that W1i has at most one member, in fact:
W1i =

{
C1i = A1(N) ∪ {pi} ∪ D1i
}
i f pi ∈ A2(C1i)
∅ otherwise
. (135)
It is obvious that
MWC1i ⊆ W1i ⊆ WC1i. (136)
Definition 19. For all pi ∈ M, we use E1i to denote the set of “optional” players in M
in the sense that (i) they are not indispensable, i.e they are not in D1i, (ii) they cannot
prevent pi being busy-2, i.e. their second dimensions are not larger than that of pi. To
be precise,
E1i =
{
p j ∈ M \
(
D1i ∪ {pi}
)
: p2j ≤ p
2
i
}
. (137)
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When WC1i is not empty, C1i and E1i determine the structure of WC1i completely.
To be exact, we have the following result.
Lemma 15. In the two dimensional C-WMMG, suppose A1(N)∩A2(N) = ∅ and neither
A1(N) nor A2(N) is a winning coalition.
(a) WC1i = ∅ iffW1i = ∅;
(b) If W1i , ∅, then WC1i =
{
C1i ∪ E : E ⊆ E1i
}
.
Proof. (a) According to definition, W1i = ∅ is equivalent to pi < A2(C1i), which im-
plies that WC1i = ∅, because there is no way for pi to be busy-2. On the other hand, if
we have WC1i = ∅, then it must be true that pi < A2(C1i), because otherwise C1i would
be a valid candidate.
(b) When W1i , ∅, then ∀X ∈ W1i, we have C1i ⊆ X. By definition, E1i is the set
of all optional players, and hence the formula. ⊓⊔
Lemma 16. The family of E1is can be computed in O(m) time.
Proof. For all pi ∈ M, by (137) and (53), we have
E1i =
{
p j ∈ M : j , i, j ≥ x(i) + 1, p2j ≤ p2i
}
. (138)
Due to (51) and (58), it is easy to prove that
E1l−1(m) \ {pl−1(m)} ⊆ E1l−1(m−1) \ {pl−1(m−1)} ⊆ · · · ⊆ E1l−1(1) \ {pl−1(1)}. (139)
Since checking whether pi ∈ E1i takes constant time, computing all the E1is can be
done in O(m) time. ⊓⊔
The following result is also easy but useful.
Lemma 17. In the two dimensional C-WMMG, suppose A1(N)∩A2(N) = ∅ and neither
A1(N) nor A2(N) is a winning coalition. ∀pi1 , pi2 ∈ M. If p2i1 , p2i2 , then WC1i1 ∩
WC1i2 = ∅.
Proof. The lemma is true because coalitions in WC1i1 have completely different busy-
2 players with those in WC1i2 . ⊓⊔
However, when p2i1 = p
2
i2 , we cannot get WC1i1 = WC1i2 . This brings some more
complication to computing WC1.
Definition 20. We use
{
M21, M22, · · · , M2n02
}
to denote the partition of M, such that
players in the same subset have the same second dimensions and
q2(M21) > q2(M22) > · · · > q2(M2n02 ). (140)
Definition 21. ∀1 ≤ s ≤ n02, for pi1 , pi2 ∈ M2s, it is straightforward that D1i1 = D1i2 .
We denote this identical set as D1(M2s), i.e.
D1(M2s) =
{
p j ∈ M : p1j + q2(N) ≥ q1(N) + q2(M2s)
}
. (141)
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Notice again it may be true that D1(M2s) ∩ M2s , ∅.
Definition 22. E1(M2s), parallel to E1i, is defined as the set of “optional” players, i.e.
E1(M2s) =
{
p j ∈ M \
(
D1(M2s) ∪ M2s) : p2j < q2(M2s)}. (142)
Definition 23. ∀1 ≤ s ≤ n02, we define αs1 as an indicator of whether M2s∩D1(M2s) = ∅,
i.e.
αs1 =
{
1 i f M2s ∩ D1(M2s) = ∅
0 otherwise . (143)
Parallel to Lemma 17, Lemma 15(b), and Lemma 16, we have
Lemma 18. In the two dimensional C-WMMG, suppose A1(N)∩A2(N) = ∅ and neither
A1(N) nor A2(N) is a winning coalition.
(a) ∀1 ≤ s1 , s2 ≤ n02,
⋃
pi∈M2s1
WC1i
 ∩

⋃
pi∈M2s2
WC1i
 = ∅; (144)
(b) ∀1 ≤ s ≤ n02,
⋃
pi∈M2s WC1i , ∅ iff q2(M2s) ≥ q2
(
A1(N) ∪ D1(M2s));
(c) ∀1 ≤ s ≤ n02, when q2
(
M2s) ≥ q2(A1(N) ∪ D1(M2s)), ⋃pi∈M2s WC1i is equal to

{
A1(N) ∪ D1(M2s) ∪ X ∪ Y : ∅ ⊂ X ⊆ M2s, Y ⊆ E1(M2s)
}
i f M2s ∩ D1(M2s) = ∅{
A1(N) ∪ D1(M2s) ∪ X ∪ Y : X ⊆ M2s \ D1(M2s), Y ⊆ E1(M2s)
}
otherwise
;
(145)
(d) ∀1 ≤ s ≤ n02, when q2
(
M2s) ≥ q2(A1(N) ∪ D1(M2s)), we have
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
⋃
pi∈M2s
WC1i
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ = 2
∣∣∣M2s\D1(M2s)∣∣∣+∣∣∣E1(M2s)∣∣∣ − αs1 · 2
∣∣∣E1 (M2s)∣∣∣; (146)
(e) The family of E1(M2s)s can be computed in O(m2) time.
Proof. (a) s1 , s2 means that M2s1 ∩M2s2 = ∅. While coalitions in
⋃
pi∈M2s1
WC1i have
at least one player in M2s1 as its busy-2 player, and
⋃
pi∈M2s2
WC1i have at least one
player in M2s2 as its busy-2 player, we know that they must be disjoint.
(b) Necessity is obvious, because otherwise no player in M2s would be busy. Suffi-
ciency is also easy because A1(N) ∪ D1(M2s) ∪ M2s is clearly a member.
(c) Due to the discussion in (b), (c) is easy. We only need to notice that if M2s ∩
D1(M2s) = ∅, we should be careful to include at least one player in M2s.
(d) Owing to (c),
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
⋃
pi∈M2s
WC1i
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ =
{
2|E1(M2s)| · (2|M2s | − 1) i f M2s ∩ D1(M2s) = ∅
2|M2s\D1(M2s)|+|E1(M2s)| otherwise . (147)
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Due to the definition of αs1, (147) is equivalent to the formula (146).
(e) Note that we do not have any nice structure that is similar to (139). Simply by
enumeration, however, O(m2) time is enough, because computing each E1(M2s) can be
done in O(m) time. ⊓⊔
We need a further notation that is parallel to (135).
Definition 24. ∀1 ≤ s ≤ n02, we denote
W1(M2s) =

{
A1(N) ∪ D1(M2s)
}
i f q2(M2s) ≥ q2(A1(N) ∪ D1(M2s))
∅ otherwise
. (148)
Denote
W1 =
⋃
1≤s≤n02
W1(M2s), (149)
then by Lemma 18 we know that it determines the structure of WC1.
Lemma 19. W1 can be computed in O(m2) time.
Proof. ∀1 ≤ s ≤ n02,∀pi1 , pi2 ∈ M2s, we know that x(i1) = x(i2). Denote it as x(M2s).
Similar to (53), D1(M2s) is nicely determined by x(M2s). It takes O(m) time, for all
1 ≤ s ≤ n02, to determine whether q2(M2s) ≥ q2
(
A1(N) ∪ D1(M2s). Combining Lemma
18(d), we know that computing the set of W1 can be done in O(m2) time. ⊓⊔
Similarly, we can define WC2i,W2i, E2i, M1i, n01, M1s, D2(M1s), E2(M1s), αs2,W2,
and parallel results hold.
When A1(N) ∩ A2(N) = ∅, and neither A1(N) nor A2(N) is a winning coalition,
similar to the structure of MWC3 in Lemma 5, the structure of WC3 is also simple.
Lemma 20. In the two dimensional C-WMMG, suppose A1(N) ∩ A2(N) = ∅, and nei-
ther A1(N) nor A2(N) is a winning coalition, then
WC3 =

{
A1(N) ∪ C ∪ D : ∅ ⊂ C ⊆ A2(N), D ⊆ M
}
i f m1 = 1{
A2(N) ∪ C ∪ D : ∅ ⊂ C ⊆ A1(N), D ⊆ M
}
i f m2 = 1{
A1(N) ∪ C ∪ D : ∅ ⊂ C ⊂ A2(N), D ⊆ M
}
⋃ {
A2(N) ∪C ∪ D : ∅ ⊂ C ⊂ A1(N), D ⊆ M
}
⋃ {
A1(N) ∪ A2(N) ∪ D : D ⊆ M
}
i f m1 > 1,m2 > 1
. (150)
Proof. ∀X ∈ WC3. If m1 = 1, we know by definition of WC3 that A1(N) ⊆ X and
X contains at least one member of A2(N), hence the formula. The case that m2 = 1 is
symmetric to the case above. If m1 > 1 and m2 > 1, the formula is also true and the
three sets are disjoint. ⊓⊔
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C.3 Summary result
Now, we are ready to present the main result of this section.
Theorem 11. In the two dimensional C-WMMG, the structure ofWC can be computed
in O(m2) time.
Proof. It is valuable to notice first that we don’t need to “enumerate” all the WCs, but
“describe” them, which can be done by enumerating the critical ones which determine
completely the whole structure. We discuss in three cases.
(i) When A1(N) ∩ A2(N) , ∅, by Lemma 13(a), WC1 = WC2 = ∅. From Lemma
13(c), we know that WC3 can be described in constant time;
(ii) When A1(N) ∩ A2(N) = ∅ and either A1(N) or A2(N) is a winning coalition, the
result hold due to Lemma 14;
(iii) When A1(N) ∩ A2(N) = ∅ and neither A1(N) nor A2(N) is a winning coalition,
we only need to show that each of WC1, WC2, and WC3 can be computed in O(m2)
time, because they are disjoint. Lemma 18 and Lemma 19 tell us that WC1 can be
described in O(m2) time. And hence WC2 by symmetry. Due to Lemma 20, WC3 can
be described in constant time. ⊓⊔
C.4 Structure ofWC3(i)
When A1(N) ∩ A2(N) = ∅, and neither A1(N) nor A2(N) is a winning coalition, discus-
sion about the structure of WC3(i) will be done in this subsection, and that of all the
other cases will be postponed to the next section.
Remember first by Lemma 12 that when pi ∈ M, we have WC3(i) = ∅.
Lemma 21. In the two dimensional C-WMMG, suppose A1(N) ∩ A2(N) = ∅, and nei-
ther A1(N) nor A2(N) is a winning coalition.
(a) When m1 > 1 and m2 > 1,
WC3(i) =

{
A1(N) ∪ C ∪ D : ∅ ⊂ C ⊂ A2(N), D ⊆ M
}
⋃ {
A2(N) ∪ {pi} ∪ D : D ⊆ M, pi is decisive
}
i f pi ∈ A1(N){
A2(N) ∪ C ∪ D : ∅ ⊂ C ⊂ A1(N), D ⊆ M
}
⋃ {
A1(N) ∪ {pi} ∪ D : D ⊆ M, pi is decisive
}
i f pi ∈ A2(N)
; (151)
(b1) When m1 = 1 and m2 > 1,
WC3(i) =

{
A1(N) ∪ C ∪ D : ∅ ⊂ C ⊂ A2(N), D ⊆ M
}
⋃ {
A2(N) ∪ {pi} ∪ D : D ⊆ M, pi is decisive
}
i f pi ∈ A1(N){
A1(N) ∪ {pi} ∪ D : D ⊆ M, pi is decisive
}
i f pi ∈ A2(N)
; (152)
(b2) When m1 > 1 and m2 = 1,
WC3(i) =

{
A2(N) ∪ {pi} ∪ D : D ⊆ M, pi is decisive
}
i f pi ∈ A1(N){
A2(N) ∪ C ∪ D : ∅ ⊂ C ⊂ A1(N), D ⊆ M
}
⋃ {
A1(N) ∪ {pi} ∪ D : D ⊆ M, pi is decisive
}
i f pi ∈ A2(N)
; (153)
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(c) When m1 = 1 and m2 = 1, ∀pi ∈ A1(N) ∪ A2(N):
WC3(i) = {A1(N) ∪ A2(N) ∪ D : D ⊆ M, pi is decisive}. (154)
Proof. (a) We only need to consider the case pi ∈ A1(N), because the other case is
symmetric. ∀X ∈ WC3(i), due to Lemma 2, either A1(N) ⊆ X or A2(N) ⊆ X. (i)
If A1(N) ⊆ X, then X must contain at least one member of A2(N) (the definition of
WC3(i)), and it cannot be true that A2(N) ⊆ X also holds, i.e. X ∩ A2(N) must be a
nonempty and proper subset of A2(N)(since m2 > 1, this can be done), because other-
wise pi would be indecisive (note the hypothesis that m1 > 1). At the same time, all the
players in M are optional. It can be checked that all coalitions satisfying the above re-
quirements are members of WC3(i). (ii) If A2(N) ⊆ X, then it must be true that pi ∈ X,
and X can only contain this single member from A1(N), because otherwise pi would be
indecisive. However, even so, we cannot guarantee that pi is decisive, and players in M
are not completely optional either. So we added a requirement that “pi is decisive”, and
hence the formula.
(b1) ∀X ∈ WC3(i). The case that pi ∈ A1(N) is identical to that in (a). When pi ∈
A2(N), then it cannot be true that A2(N) ⊆ X, because combining with A1(N) ∩ X , ∅
and m2 > 1 would give that pi is indecisive. Therefore we have A1(N) ⊆ X, and pi must
be the only member from A2(N) contained by X. Still, we cannot guarantee that pi is
always decisive. Hence the formula.
(b2) Symmetric to (b1).
(c) ∀X ∈ WC3(i). Since there is only one member in each of A1(N) and A2(N), the
two players must both be contained by X. Still, pi cannot be guaranteed to be decisive.
Hence the formula. ⊓⊔
The above lemma gives us a very rough whole picture of the structure of WC3(i).
It helps, but solves only a very little part of the problem.
Definition 25. ∀pi ∈ A1(N) ∪ A2(N), we denote
WC3∗(i) =

{
{pi} ∪ A2(N) ∪ D : D ⊆ M, pi is decisive
}
i f pi ∈ A1(N){
{pi} ∪ A1(N) ∪ D : D ⊆ M, pi is decisive
}
i f pi ∈ A2(N)
. (155)
To completely understand the structure of WC3(i), we know from Lemma 21 that
we need to find an efficient way to describe WC3∗(i).
Definition 26. Suppose pi ∈ A1(N). We denote ∆1 as the set of all possible busy-2
players when pi moves to the complementary coalition from a coalition in WC3∗(i),
i.e.
∆1 = A2(A1(N)) ∪
{
p j ∈ M : p2j ≥ q2
(
A1(N))}. (156)
Definition 27. For all pi ∈ A1(N) and p j ∈ ∆1, we use WC3∗(1, i, j) to denote the set
of coalitions in WC3∗(i) where p j is busy-2 if pi moves to the complementary coalition,
i.e.
WC3∗(1, i, j) =
{
{pi} ∪ A2(N) ∪ D : D ⊆ M \ {p j},
q1(N) + p2j = q
(
A1(N) ∪ {pi} ∪ (M \ D)) ≥ q(A2(N) ∪ D)} . (157)
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Definition 28. For all p j ∈ ∆1, we also let
M+2 j =
{
pk ∈ M : p2k > p
2
j
}
, (158)
¯D1 j =
{
pk ∈ M : p1k + q2(N) ≤ q1(N) + q2j
}
. (159)
Lemma 22. ∀pi ∈ A1(N) and p j ∈ ∆1,
WC3∗(1, i, j) =
{
{pi} ∪ A2(N) ∪ D : M+2 j ⊆ D ⊆ ¯D1 j
}
. (160)
Proof. M+2 j is the set of players in M whose second dimensions are bigger than that of
p j. In order to guarantee that p j is busy-2 in the new coalition, none member of M+2 j
should be in the complementary coalition, and therefore it must hold that D ⊇ M+2 j.
¯D1 j is the set of players in M whose first dimensions are not so big that without p j the
coalition is still winning, and therefore D ⊆ ¯D1 j. Hence the lemma. ⊓⊔
We remark that Lemma 22 also implies that WC3∗(1, i, j) = ∅ if M+2 j * ¯D1 j.
Lemma 23. For all pi ∈ A1(N) and p j1 , p j2 ∈ ∆1.
(a) If p2j1 = p2j2 , then WC3∗(1, i, j1) =WC3∗(1, i, j2);
(b) If p2j1 , p2j2 , then WC3∗(1, i, j1) ∩WC3∗(1, i, j2) = ∅.
Proof. Immediate from Lemma 22. ⊓⊔
Definition 29. We use ∆∗1 to denote an arbitrary maximum subset of ∆1 such that no
pair of players have the same second dimension.
Lemma 24. In the two dimensional C-WMMG, suppose A1(N) ∩ A2(N) = ∅, and nei-
ther A1(N) nor A2(N) is a winning coalition. Then for all pi ∈ A1(N),
WC3∗(i) =
⋃
p j∈∆∗1
WC3∗(1, i, j) (161)
.
Proof. Immediate from Lemma 23. ⊓⊔
We can similarly define ∆2 and ∆∗2. For all pi ∈ A2(N), p j ∈ ∆2, we defineWC3∗(2, i, j),
M+1 j, ¯D2 j, and results parallel to Lemma 22, Lemma 23 and Lemma 24 all hold.
Definition 30. For all pi ∈ A1(N) and p j ∈ ∆1, define
d1 j =
{
1 i f M+2 j ⊆ ¯D1 j
0 otherwise . (162)
For all pi ∈ A2(N) and p j ∈ ∆2, d2 j is similarly defined.
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Lemma 25. In the two dimensional C-WMMG, suppose A1(N)∩A2(N) = ∅ and neither
A1(N) nor A2(N) is winning. Then
|WC3(i)| =

2m(2m2 − 2) +∑p j∈∆∗1 d1 j · 2| ¯D1 j\M+2 j | i f pi ∈ A1(N)
2m(2m1 − 2) +∑p j∈∆∗2 d2 j · 2| ¯D2 j\M+1 j | i f pi ∈ A2(N) . (163)
Proof. Suppose now m1 > 1 and m2 > 1. ∀pi ∈ A1(N). According to Lemma 21,
WC3(i) consists of two parts, and the first part has a cardinality of 2m(2m2 − 2). Due
to Lemma 22, Lemma 23, and Lemma 24, ∑p j∈∆∗1 d1 j · 2| ¯D1 j\M+2 j| is the cardinality of the
second part. Hence the formula. It is symmetric for pi ∈ A2(N). For all the other cases,
it can be checked that the formula still holds. ⊓⊔
D Computing Penrose-Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik indices
Computing Penrose-Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik indices is even more tedious than
computing Holler-Packel and Deegan-Packel indices. This is quite expected because
they rely on WC (to be precise, WC(i)s) instead of MWC, and we have already seen
that the structure of WC is much more complicated than that of MWC.
One more trouble is that the analysis of WC(i) is incomplete in the previous sec-
tions. To be precise, when A1(N)∩A2(N) , ∅, the discussion is done by Lemma 12 and
Lemma 13; When A1(N)∩ A2(N) = ∅ and either A1(N) or A2(N) is a winning coalition,
the analysis is done by Lemma 14. However, analysis in the most complicated case, i.e.
A1(N) ∩ A2(N) = ∅ and neither A1(N) nor A2(N) is a winning coalition, is not enough,
though we have already had a clear understanding of the structure of WC3(i) from the
final part of the previous section.
D.1 The simple cases
Based on Lemma 12, Lemma 13 and Lemma 14, computing Penrose-Banzhaf and
Shapley-Shubik indices in the case A1(N) ∩ A2(N) , ∅ and the cases where A1(N) ∩
A2(N) = ∅ and either A1(N) is winning or A2(N) is winning is straightforward. We omit
the exact formulas to save space.
D.2 The complex case
We are left to discuss the most complicated case, i.e. the case A1(N) ∩ A2(N) = ∅ and
neither A1(N) nor A2(N) is winning.
Above all, we need a concept similar to Definition 16.
Definition 31. ∀pi ∈ N, we use WC1(i) to denote the set of winning coalitions in
WC1 that contain pi as a decisive player, i.e.
WC1(i) =
{
C ∈ WC1 : C ∋ pi,C \ {pi} <WC
}
. (164)
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Definition 32. ∀pi, p j ∈ N, we use WC1(i, j) to denote the set of winning coalitions in
WC1 j such that pi is decisive, i.e.
WC1(i, j) =WC1(i) ∩WC1 j. (165)
Lemma 26. In the two dimensional C-WMMG, suppose A1(N) ∩ A2(N) = ∅ and nei-
ther A1(N) nor A2(N) is winning. ∀p j1 , p j2 ∈ M. If p2j1 , p2j1 , then WC1(i, j1) ∩
WC1(i, j2) = ∅.
Proof. Directly from Lemma 17. ⊓⊔
However, even if p2j1 = p
2
j1 , we may not get that WC1(i, j1) =WC1(i, j2), because
WC1 j1 =WC1 j2 is not guaranteed.
Definition 33. ∀pi ∈ N and 1 ≤ s ≤ n02, we define WC1(i, M2s) as the set of coalitions
in WC1 such that pi is decisive and busy-2 players are taken from M2s, i.e.
WC1(i, M2s) =
⋃
p j∈M2s
WC1(i, j). (166)
Lemma 27. In the two dimensional C-WMMG, suppose A1(N)∩A2(N) = ∅ and neither
A1(N) nor A2(N) is winning. ∀1 ≤ s ≤ n02, and suppose also that q2
(
M2s) ≥ q2(A1(N)∪
D1(M2s)).
(a) If pi ∈ A1(N) ∪ D1(M2s), then
|WC1(i, M2s)| = 2
∣∣∣M2s\D1(M2s)∣∣∣+∣∣∣E1 (M2s)∣∣∣ − αs1 · 2
∣∣∣E1(M2s)∣∣∣; (167)
(b) If pi ∈ E1(M2s), then |WC1(i, M2s)| = 0.
Proof. Due to Lemma 18(b), q2(M2s) ≥ q2(A1(N)∪D1(M2s)) implies that⋃p j∈M2s WC1 j ,
∅. To verify this lemma, it is sufficient to notice from Lemma 18(c) that all the players in
A1(N)∪D1(M2s) are always decisive and players in E1(M2s) are always bench-warmers.
⊓⊔
Definition 34. Let s2(i) be the index s in {1, 2, · · · , n02} such that pi ∈ M2s.
Lemma 27, however, didn’t give us a complete description of all the WC1(i, M2s)s.
To be precise,WC1(i, M2s2(i)) may not be covered. For each pi ∈ M, if pi ∈ D1(M2s2(i)),
then Lemma 27 is applicable. In the case that pi < D1(M2s2(i)), calculating |WC1(i, M2s2(i))|
needs more delicate analysis.
First of all, we show that the problem of computing |WC1(i, M2s2(i))| can be reduced
to computing |WC1(i, i)|. In fact, the two sets are identical.
Lemma 28. ∀pi ∈ M, we have
WC1(i, M2s2(i)) =WC1(i, i). (168)
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Proof. By definition, it is trivial that WC1(i, i) ⊆ WC1(i, M2s2(i)). On the other hand,
∀X ∈ WC1(i, M2s2(i)),pi must be a busy-2 player of X, because busy-2 players of X are
drawn from M2s2(i), and pi has the same second dimension as any one in M2s2(i). Hence
it also holds that WC1(i, M2s2(i)) ⊆ WC1(i, i) and the lemma is valid. ⊓⊔
Second of all, let us show that checking whether WC1(i, i) = ∅ or not is easy.
Lemma 29. WC1(i, i) , ∅ if and only if C1i ∈ MWC1i, i.e. C1i is an MWC with pi
being a busy-2 player.
Proof. Sufficiency is self-evident. Suppose now WC1(i, i) , ∅, then there exists C1i ∪
E ∈ WC1(i, i), where E ⊆ E1i. By definition of E1i, we know that q(C1i ∪ E) = q(C1i)
and q(C−1i) = q((C1i ∪ E)−). Therefore, C1i is still winning, and pi is still busy-2 and
decisive in C1i. Hence C1i ∈ MWC1i. ⊓⊔
Notice that when C1i ∈ MWC1i, we still cannot guarantee that pi is decisive in each
C1i ∪ E. In fact, the main complication in the following analysis is that ∀X ∈ WC1i, pi
may not be decisive in X (the only information we know is that she is busy). A naive
idea is to check all the coalitions in WC1i, one by one, to see whether pi is decisive.
However, this set may have an exponential cardinality, so the naive idea does not work.
We find that analyzing the complementary coalitions (added by pi) may be more
convenient than directly analyzing WC1(i, i).
Definition 35. ∀pi ∈ M such that pi < D1i, let H1i be the set of coalitions constructed
by moving pi from coalitions in WC1(i, i) to the corresponding complementary coali-
tions, i.e.
H1i =
{
X− ∪ {pi} : X ∈ WC1(i, i)
}
. (169)
Lemma 30. When WC1(i, i) , ∅, we can rewrite H1i as
H1i =
{
X = (C1i ∪ E1i)− ∪ {pi} ∪ E : E ⊆ E1i, q(X) ≥ q(X−)
}
. (170)
Proof. ∀X0 ∈ WC1(i, i). Since WC1(i, i) ⊆ WC1i = {C1i ∪ E : E ⊆ E1i}, we know
there is an E0 ⊆ E1i such that X0 = C1i ∪ E0. Therefore, X−0 ∪ {pi} = (C1i ∪ E1i)− ∪
{pi} ∪ (E1i \ E0). Let X = X−0 ∪ {pi}. Because E1i \ E0 ⊆ E1i and q(X) ≥ q(X−) (pi is
decisive in X0), we know that X belongs to the right hand side set of this lemma. The
other direction of inclusion is also easy. ⊓⊔
Then
|WC1(i, i)| = |H1i|. (171)
Still, the definition of H1i, as well as the equivalent formula, is but an expression.
To calculate its cardinality, we need to do some further decomposition such that all the
elements are efficiently computable.
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Definition 36. We denote B1i as the subset of H1i where no busy-1 player is in the
corresponding E, i.e.
B1i =
{
X = (C1i ∪ E1i)− ∪ {pi} ∪ E : E ⊆ E1i, X ∈ H1i, A1(X) ∩ E = ∅
}
, (172)
and for all p j ∈ E1i, let B1i j be the subset of H1i where p j is a busy-1 player, i.e.
B1i j =
{
X = (C1i ∪ E1i)− ∪ {pi} ∪ E : E ⊆ E1i, X ∈ H1i, p j ∈ A1(X) ∩ E
}
. (173)
To ensure that B1i j is nonempty, p1j should be big enough.
Definition 37. ∀pi ∈ M such that pi < D1i. Let E01i be the set of players in E1i whosefirst dimensions are large enough such that they may be busy-1 players in B1i j:
E01i =
{
p j ∈ E1i : p1j ≥ q1
((C1i ∪ E1i)− ∪ {pi})}. (174)
Then ∀p j ∈ E1i \ E01i, we have B1i j = ∅. Therefore, we can rewrite H1i as
H1i = B1i ∪
⋃
p j∈E01i
B1i j. (175)
It is obvious that for all p j ∈ E01i,
B1i ∩ B1i j = ∅, (176)
because any pair of coalitions from the two families, respectively, have different busy-1
player sets.
Definition 38. ∀pi ∈ M such that pi < D1i. We use ˆE1i and ˆD1i to denote the set of
potentially optional players, and the set of blocking players, respectively:
ˆE1i =
{
p j ∈ E1i : q
((C1i \ {pi}) ∪ {p j}) ≤ q((C1i ∪ E1i)− ∪ {pi})}, (177)
ˆD1i =
{
p j ∈ E1i : p1j ≥ q1
((C1i ∪ E1i)− ∪ {pi})}. (178)
We also use δ1i to denote the indicator of whether ˆD1i \ ˆE1i = ∅, i.e.
δ1i =
{
1 i f ˆD1i \ ˆE1i = ∅
0 otherwise . (179)
Lemma 31. In the two dimensional C-WMMG, suppose A1(N)∩A2(N) = ∅ and neither
A1(N) nor A2(N) is winning. ∀pi ∈ M such that pi < D1i. Suppose WC1(i, i) , ∅. Then
B1i =

{
(C1i ∪ E1i)− ∪ {pi} ∪ E : E ⊆ ˆE1i \ ˆD1i
}
i f ˆD1i \ ˆE1i = ∅
∅ otherwise
, (180)
and therefore
|B1i| = δ1i · 2|
ˆE1i\ ˆD1i|. (181)
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Proof. ∀E ⊆ E1i, let X(E) = (C1i ∪ E1i)− ∪ {pi} ∪ E, then the corresponding coalition
in WC1(i, i) is
Y(E) = C1i ∪ (E1i \ E) = A1(N) ∪ D1i ∪ {pi} ∪ (E1i \ E). (182)
By definition, X(E) ∈ B1i if and only if the following four conditions hold: (i) pi is
busy-2 in Y(E), (ii) Y(E) is winning, (iii) pi is decisive in Y(E), (iv) A1(X(E)) ∩ E = ∅.
When ˆD1i \ ˆE1i , ∅, let p j ∈ A1
(
ˆD1i \ ˆE1i
)
. Obviously, p j should not be contained
in E, because otherwise, from p j ∈ ˆD1i, we would have p j ∈ A1(X(E)) ∩ E. Hence it
must be true that p j ∈ Y(E). However, p j ∈ E1i \ ˆE1i implies that q(X(E)−) > q(X(E)),
a contradiction with condition (iii).
Suppose now ˆD1i \ ˆE1i = ∅. On the one hand, ∀X(E) ∈ B1i, condition (iv) implies
that
q(X(E)) = q((C1i ∪ E1i)− ∪ {pi}). (183)
Therefore, we must have
E ⊆ ˆE1i, (184)
because any player in E1i \ ˆE1i belonging to E can guarantee that Y(E) \ {pi} is still
winning, a contradiction with condition (iii). Also,
E ∩ ˆD1i = ∅ (185)
must hold because otherwise condition (iv) would be violated. Combining (184) and
(185) we arrive at E ⊆ ˆE1i \ ˆD1i
On the other hand, for any subset E of ˆE1i \ ˆD1i, we prove that X(E) and Y(E)
satisfy the four conditions. Due to Lemma 15(b), Lemma 29, and the hypothesis that
WC1(i, i) , ∅, we know that condition (i) and condition (ii) are both true. Condition
(iv) is true because E∩ ˆD1i = ∅. Condition (iii) is valid due to condition (iv) and E ⊆ ˆE1i.
To sum up, (180) is valid, and hence the lemma. ⊓⊔
Definition 39. ∀pi ∈ M such that pi < D1i. We define E001i as a refinement of E01i:
E001i =
{
p j ∈ E01i : ˆD1i j ⊆ ˆE1i j
}
, (186)
where
ˆE1i j =
{
pk ∈ E1i : k , j, q((C1i \ {pi}) ∪ {pk}) ≤ p1j + q2(N)}, (187)
ˆD1i j =
{
pk ∈ E1i : p1k > p
1
j
}
, (188)
for all p j ∈ E01i.
Lemma 32. In the two dimensional C-WMMG, suppose A1(N)∩A2(N) = ∅ and neither
A1(N) nor A2(N) is winning. ∀pi ∈ M such that pi < D1i. Suppose also WC1(i, i) , ∅.
(a) If p j ∈ E01i \ E001i , then B1i j = ∅.
(b) For any p j, pk ∈ E001i , if p1j , p1k , then B1i j ∩ B1ik = ∅.
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Proof. (a) By definition, p j ∈ E01i \ E001i means that ˆD1i j * ˆE1i j. Therefore, there exists
a player w who is in ˆD1i j but not in ˆE1i j. ∀X ∈ B1i j, using an argument similar to that in
the proof to Lemma 31, we can show that there is always a contradiction, regardless of
whether w ∈ X or not. Hence such X does not exist, i.e. B1i j = ∅.
(b) Self-evident by definition. ⊓⊔
However, when p1j = p
1
k , we cannot get B1i j = B1ik.
Still as in Section C, we let {M11, M12, · · · , M1n10 } be a partition of M, such that
players in the same subset have the same first dimensions and players from different
subsets have different first dimensions.
Definition 40. ∀pi ∈ M such that pi < D1i, and 1 ≤ s ≤ n10, let
ˆE s1i =
{
pk ∈ E1i : q((C1i \ {pi}) ∪ {pk}) ≤ q1(M1s) + q2(N)
}
, (189)
ˆDs1i =
{
p j ∈ E1i : p j > q1(M1s)
}
, (190)
δs1i =
{
1 i f ˆDs1i \ ˆE s1i = ∅
0 otherwise . (191)
Lemma 33. In the two dimensional C-WMMG, suppose A1(N)∩A2(N) = ∅ and neither
A1(N) nor A2(N) is winning. ∀pi ∈ M such that pi < D1i.
(a) If δs1i = 0, then
⋃
p j∈M1s∩E001i
B1i j = ∅.
(b) If δs1i = 1, then⋃
p j∈M1s∩E001i
B1i j =
{
(C1i ∪ E1i)− ∪ {pi} ∪ E : E ⊆ ˆE s1i \ ˆDs1i, E ∩ (E001i ∩ M1s) , ∅
}
. (192)
(c) ∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
⋃
p j∈M1s∩E001i
B1i j
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ = δ
s
1i
(
2| ˆEs1i\ ˆDs1i| − 2|( ˆEs1i\ ˆDs1i)\(E001i ∩M1s)|
)
. (193)
Proof. (a) δs1i = 0 means that there exists a player in ˆE s1i \ ˆDs1i. ∀p j ∈ M1s ∩ E001i ,
∀X ∈ B1i j, using a similar argument as in the proof of Lemma 31, we can derive a
contradiction. Hence such X does not exist, i.e. B1i j = ∅.
(b) Similar to the proof of Lemma 31. We only need to be careful to let the coalitions
in
⋃
p j∈M1s∩E001i
B1i j contain at least one member of E001i ∩ M1s.
(c) Straightforward from (a) and (b). Notice that 2|( ˆEs1i\ ˆDs1i)\(E001i ∩M1s)| is the number
of coalitions where no player in E001i ∩M1s is included. Such coalitions are not qualified
and we need to exclude them. ⊓⊔
Lemma 34. In the two dimensional C-WMMG, suppose A1(N)∩A2(N) = ∅ and neither
A1(N) nor A2(N) is winning. ∀pi ∈ M such that pi < D1i:
|WC1(i, i)| = δ1i · 2| ˆE1i\ ˆD1i | +
∑
1≤s≤n01
δs1i
(
2| ˆEs1i\ ˆDs1i| − 2|( ˆEs1i\ ˆDs1i)\(E001i ∩M1s)|
)
. (194)
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Proof. This lemma is a combination of (171), (175), (176), Lemma 31, Lemma 32 and
Lemma 33(c). ⊓⊔
We remark that when pi ∈ D1i, then the above formula should be consistent with
the one in part (a) of Lemma 27, because the condition that pi < D1i is never used.
Similarly, we defineWC2(i, j),H2i, E02i, ˆE2i, ˆD2i,B2i,B2i j, ˆE2i j, ˆD2i j, E002i , ˆE s2i, δ2i, δs2i,
then results parallel to Lemma 27, Lemma 28, Lemma 29, Lemma 30, Lemma 31,
Lemma 32, Lemma 33 and Lemma 34 hold.
Penrose-Banzhaf indices
Definition 41. We use M1∗ to denote the set of s such that ⋃p j∈M2s WC1 j , ∅. Accord-
ing to Lemma 18(b),
M1∗ =
{
1 ≤ s ≤ n02 : q2
(
M2s) ≥ q2(A1(N) ∪ D1(M2s))}. (195)
Similarly, we define:
M2∗ =
{
1 ≤ s ≤ n01 : q1
(
M1s) ≥ q1(A1(N) ∪ D2(M1s))}. (196)
While
WC1(i) ⊆ WC1 (197)
and
WC1 =
⋃
1≤s≤n02
(
∪p j∈Ms2WC1 j
)
, (198)
we have the following useful decomposition:
WC1(i) =WC1(i) ∩WC1 (199)
=WC1(i)
⋂
⋃
1≤s≤n02
(
∪p j∈Ms2WC1 j
) (200)
=
⋃
1≤s≤n02
(
WC1(i)
⋂(
∪p j∈Ms2WC1 j
))
(201)
=
⋃
1≤s≤n02
WC1(i, M2s) (202)
=
⋃
s∈M1∗
WC1(i, M2s). (203)
Parallel decomposition holds for WC2(i).
We need two final notations.
Definition 42. ∀pi ∈ M, let λ1i be the indicator of whether |WC1(i, i)| is nonzero and
should be counted in calculating |WC1(i)|. According to Lemma 29,
λ1i =
{
1 i f pi < D1(M2s2(i)) and C1i ∈ MWC1i
0 otherwise , (204)
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Similarly, we define
λ2i =
{
1 i f pi < D2(M1s1(i)) and C2i ∈ MWC2i
0 otherwise . (205)
Theorem 12. In the two dimensional C-WMMG, suppose A1(N) ∩ A2(N) = ∅ and
neither A1(N) nor A2(N) is winning.
(a1) If pi ∈ A1(N), then
pbi =
1
2n−1
2m(2m2 − 2) +
∑
p j∈∆∗1
d1 j · 2|
¯D1 j\M+2 j |+ (206)
∑
s∈M1∗
(
2
∣∣∣M2s\D1(M2s)∣∣∣+∣∣∣E1 (M2s)∣∣∣ − αs1 · 2
∣∣∣E1(M2s)∣∣∣)
 ; (207)
(a2) If pi ∈ A2(N), then
pbi =
1
2n−1
2m(2m1 − 2) +
∑
p j∈∆∗2
d2 j · 2|
¯D2 j\M+1 j |+ (208)
∑
s∈M2∗
(
2
∣∣∣M1s\D2(M1s)∣∣∣+∣∣∣E2 (M1s)∣∣∣ − αs2 · 2
∣∣∣E2(M1s)∣∣∣)
 ; (209)
(b) If pi ∈ M, then
pbi =
1
2n−1

∑
s∈M1∗:pi∈D1(M2s)
(
2
∣∣∣M2s\D1(M2s)∣∣∣+∣∣∣E1(M2s)∣∣∣ − αs1 · 2
∣∣∣E1 (M2s)∣∣∣) (210)
+
∑
s∈M2∗:pi∈D2(M1s)
(
2
∣∣∣M1s\D2(M1s)∣∣∣+∣∣∣E2 (M1s)∣∣∣ − αs2 · 2
∣∣∣E2(M1s)∣∣∣) (211)
+
∑
t=1,2
λti
δti · 2
∣∣∣ ˆEti\ ˆDti∣∣∣ + ∑
1≤s≤nt0
δsti ·
(
2
∣∣∣ ˆEsti\ ˆDsti∣∣∣ − 2
∣∣∣ ˆEsti\ ˆDsti∣∣∣−∣∣∣E00ti ∩Mts∣∣∣)

 . (212)
Proof. By definition of Penrose-Banzhaf index, ∀pi ∈ N, we have:
pbi =
1
2n−1
(
|WC3(i)| + |WC1(i)| + |WC2(i)|
)
. (213)
(a1) First of all, ∀pi ∈ A1(N), since WC2 is the set of winning coalitions where no
player in A1(N) is included, we know that
WC2(i) = ∅. (214)
Second of all,
WC1(i, M2s) =
⋃
p j∈M2s
WC1 j, (215)
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because pi ∈ A1(N) implies that pi is decisive in each coalition of ∪p j∈M2sWC1 j.
Combining (203) (213) (214) (243), Lemma 18(a)(d), and Lemma 25, we get part
(a1) of this theorem.
(a2) Symmetric to (a1).
(b) For pi ∈ M, since WC3(i) = ∅ (Lemma 12), we have:
pbi = |WC1(i)| + |WC2(i)| . (216)
|WC1(i)| can be decomposed further as:
|WC1(i)| =
∑
s∈M1∗:pi∈D1(M2s)
|WC1(i, M2s)| +
∑
s∈M1∗:pi<D1(M2s)
|WC1(i, M2s)|. (217)
For each s , s2(i), pi < D1(M2s) implies that pi ∈ E1(M2s). By Lemma 27(b),
∑
s∈M1∗\{s2(i)}:pi<D1(M2s)
|WC1(i, M2s)| = 0. (218)
Combining (217)(218), we have
|WC1(i)| =
∑
s∈M1∗:pi∈D1(M2s)
|WC1(i, M2s)| + λ1i|WC1(i, M2s2(i))| (219)
=
∑
s∈M1∗:pi∈D1(M2s)
|WC1(i, M2s)| + λ1i|WC1(i, i)|, (220)
where the second equality is valid because of Lemma 28.
We have a similar formula for |WC2(i)|.
When pi ∈ D1(M2s), Lemma 27(a) is applicable to compute |WC1(i, M2s)|. Lemma
34 is used to compute |WC1(i, i)|. Based on the above discussion, part (b) of this theo-
rem is valid. ⊓⊔
Shapley-Shubik indices For computing Shapley-Shubik indices, we have the follow-
ing formulas.
Theorem 13. In the two dimensional C-WMMG, suppose A1(N) ∩ A2(N) = ∅ and
neither A1(N) nor A2(N) is winning.
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(a1) If pi ∈ A1(N), then
ssi =
m2−1∑
c=1
m∑
d=0
Ccm2 ·C
d
m ·
(m1 + c + d − 1)!(n − m1 − c − d)!
n!
(221)
+
∑
p j∈∆∗1
| ¯D1 j\M+2 j |∑
d=0
d1 j ·Cd| ¯D1 j\M+2 j| ·
(m2 + d)!(n − m2 − d − 1)!
n! (222)
+
∑
s∈M1∗

|M2s\D1(M2s)|∑
c=0
|E1(M2s)|∑
d=0
Cc|M2s\D1(M2s)| ·C
d
|E1(M2s)| (223)
·
(m1 + |D1(M2s)| + c + d − 1)!(n − m1 − |D1(M2s)| − c − d)!
n!
(224)
−αs1
|E1(M2s)|∑
d=0
Cd|E1(M2s)| ·
(m1 + |D1(M2s)| + d − 1)!(n − m1 − |D1(M2s)| − d)!
n!
 ,(225)
where the right hand side of (221) is defined as zero when m2 = 1;
(a2) If pi ∈ A1(N), then
ssi =
m1−1∑
c=1
m∑
d=0
Ccm1 ·C
d
m ·
(m2 + c + d − 1)!(n − m2 − c − d)!
n!
(226)
+
∑
p j∈∆∗2
| ¯D2 j\M+1 j |∑
d=0
d2 j ·Cd| ¯D2 j\M+1 j| ·
(m1 + d)!(n − m1 − d − 1)!
n!
(227)
+
∑
s∈M2∗

|M1s\D2(M1s)|∑
c=0
|E2(M1s)|∑
d=0
Cc|M1s\D2(M1s)| ·C
d
|E2(M1s)| (228)
·
(m2 + |D2(M1s)| + c + d − 1)!(n − m2 − |D2(M1s)| − c − d)!
n!
(229)
−αs2
|E2(M1s)|∑
d=0
Cd|E2(M1s)| ·
(m2 + |D2(M1s)| + d − 1)!(n − m2 − |D2(M1s)| − d)!
n!
 ,(230)
where the right hand side of (226) is defined as zero when m1 = 1;
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(b) If pi ∈ M, then
ssi =
∑
s∈M1∗:pi∈D1(M2s)

|M2s\D1(M2s)|∑
c=0
|E1(M2s)|∑
d=0
Cc|M2s\D1(M2s)| · C
d
|E1(M2s)| (231)
·
(m1 + |D1(M2s)| + c + d − 1)!(n − m1 − |D1(M2s)| − c − d)!
n!
(232)
−αs1
|E1(M2s)|∑
d=0
Cd|E1 (M2s)| ·
(m1 + |D1(M2s)| + d − 1)!(n − m1 − |D1(M2s)| − d)!
n!
 (233)
+
∑
s∈M2∗:pi∈D2(M1s)

|M1s\D2(M1s)|∑
c=0
|E2(M1s)|∑
d=0
Cc|M1s\D2(M1s)| ·C
d
|E2(M1s)| (234)
·
(m2 + |D2(M1s)| + c + d − 1)!(n − m2 − |D2(M1s)| − c − d)!
n!
(235)
−αs2
|E2(M1s)|∑
d=0
Cd|E2 (M1s)| ·
(m2 + |D2(M1s)| + d − 1)!(n − m2 − |D2(M1s)| − d)!
n!
 (236)
+
∑
t=1,2
λti
δti ·
| ˆEti\ ˆDti|∑
l=0
Cl
| ˆEti\ ˆDti|
(|Cti| + |Eti| − l − 1)!(n − |Cti| − |Eti| + l)!
n!
(237)
+
∑
1≤s≤nt0
δsti ·

| ˆEsti\ ˆD
s
ti|∑
l=0
Cl
| ˆEsti\ ˆD
s
ti|
(|Cti| + |Eti| − l − 1)!(n − |Cti| − |Eti| + l)!
n!
(238)
−
|( ˆEsti\ ˆDsti)\(E00ti ∩Mts)|∑
l=0
Cl
|( ˆEsti\ ˆDsti)\(E00ti ∩Mts)|
(|Cti| + |Eti| − l − 1)!(n − |Cti| − |Eti| + l)!
n!
) .(239)
Proof. Above all, due to the definition of the Shapley-Shubik index in (4) and the de-
composition of WC(i), we have
ssi =
∑
C∈WC1(i)
(|C| − 1)!(n − |C|)!
n!
+
∑
C∈WC2(i)
(|C| − 1)!(n − |C|)!
n!
(240)
+
∑
C∈WC3(i)
(|C| − 1)!(n − |C|)!
n!
. (241)
(a1) Note first pi ∈ A2(N) implies that
WC2(i) = ∅, (242)
therefore the middle part of ssi is zero.
Let us consider the third part of ssi, i.e. formula (241). Suppose for the moment that
m1 > 1 and m2 > 1. Due to Lemma 21(a), WC3(i) consists of two parts. For the first
part, a general coalition can be expressed as A1(N) ∪ C ∪ D, where ∅ ⊂ C ⊂ A2(N)
and D ⊆ M. Let c denote the cardinality of C and d the cardinality of D, then there
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are a total of Ccm2C
d
m such combinations of C and D with these fixed cardinalities. The
requirements that 1 ≤ c ≤ m2 − 1 and 0 ≤ d ≤ m are trivial. Therefore, the right
hand side of (221) is exactly the first part of WC3(i). Due to Lemma 22, Lemma 23,
and Lemma 24, formula (222) corresponds to the second part. It can be checked that
formulas (221) and (222) are also valid for the other cases, i.e. the cases where at least
one of m1 and m2 is 1.
We are left the final part, i.e.
∑
C∈WC1(i)
(|C|−1)!(n−|C|)!
n! . As in the proof to Theorem
12(a1),
WC1(i, M2s) =
⋃
p j∈M2s
WC1 j, (243)
because pi ∈ A1(N) implies that pi is decisive in each coalition of ∪p j∈M2sWC1 j. Due
to Lemma 18(a)(c), we know that (223)(224)(225) correspond to the this final part.
Based on the above discussions, part (a1) of this theorem is correct.
(a2) Symmetric to (a1).
(b) We prove by using similar arguments as in the proof to Theorem 12(b). First
of all, pi ∈ M implies that WC3(i) = ∅ (Lemma 12). Hence ssi consists of two parts:
contribution fromWC1(i) and contribution fromWC2(i). We shall prove that (the right
hand side of) (231), (232), (241), and the t = 1 half of (237)(238)(239) correspond to
WC1(i) (the rest formulas correspond to WC2(i) by symmetry).
Due to Lemma 18(c), (the right hand side of) (231), (232), (241) correspond to
all the contribution of WC1(i), except possibly for WC1(i, M1s2(i)). This possibility
is characterized by indicator λ1i. When λ1i = 1, it can be checked that the (237) part
within the square brackets is the contribution from
{
C− ∪ {pi} : C ∈ B1i
}
, (244)
(owing to Lemma 31), while the (238) and (239) part is the contribution from
⋃
p j∈M2s
{
C− ∪ {pi} : C ∈ B1i j
}
, (245)
owing to Lemma 33(a)(b). ⊓⊔
D.3 Summary result
Theorem 14. Computing all the Penrose-Banzhaf indices and computing all the Shapley-
Shubik indices can both be done in O(n3) time.
Proof. Using similar arguments as in the proof to Lemma 18(e), computing all the
necessary parameters can be done in O(m2) time. We omit the detailed analysis.
In the formulas of Theorem 12, each elementary operation (addition, subtraction,
multiplication, division, and the exponentiation with base 2), can be done in O(m) time.
For each player pi, there are O(m) such operations, so computing the Penrose-Banzhaf
index of each player can be done in O(m2) time. Since there are n players in total, and
m = O(n), we know that computing all the Penrose-Banzhaf indices can be done in
O(n3) time.
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In the formulas of Theorem 13, the complication is that factorials are involved,
and usually we cannot compute the exact values (this is not the case in Theorem 13,
though division is also involved there). We assume that the precision length is given as
a constant, and thus computing a factorial, as well as division and other elementary op-
erations, can be done in constant time. For each player, to calculate the Shapley-Shubik
index we need to do O(m2) such operations. Since there are n players in total, comput-
ing all the Penrose-Banzhaf indices can be done in O(n3) time. Hence the theorem. ⊓⊔
E List of Notations
Notations listed below have already been defined the first time they appear, and the
aim of this section is to help the reader find their meanings more conveniently. The
list, nevertheless, is not complete. Notations that are used only once are excluded. In
particular, indicators, as a class, are not included, because most of them are used only
once, right after their definitions. A more self-evident way to denote the indicators is
to write them in the form of “Is(X)”, where X is a statement, meaning that the value is
1 if statement X is true and 0 otherwise. However, that would make the main formulas
overly long. So we finally took the current more concise approach. Note also that for
several notations that would be not clear enough and even confusing if an index k ∈
{1, 2} was introduced to indicate which dimension we are concentrating on, we only
listed a half of them. The other half is symmetric.
Basic Ones
– ⊆: set inclusion
– ⊂: strict set inclusion, i.e. X ⊂ Y means that X ⊆ Y and Y ⊆ X is not true
– N: total set of players
– n: total number of players, i.e. n = |N|
– C−: the complement of C, i.e. C− = N \C
– | · |: the cardinality of a set
– Ak(N): set of busy-k players (of the grand coalition N), k = 1, 2
– mk: number of busy-k players (of the grand coalition N),i.e. mk = |Ak(N)|, k = 1, 2
– qk(C): largest k-th dimension of coalition C, k = 1, 2
– q(C) = q1(C) + q2(C)
– Ak(C): set of busy-k players of coalition C, k = 1, 2
– B(C): set of busy players of coalition C, i.e. B(C) = A1(C) ∪ A2(C)
– M: set of bench-warmers (of the grand coalition N), i.e. M = N \ B(N)
– m: number of bench-warmers (of the grand coalition N), i.e. m = |M|
– D1i =
{
p j ∈ M : p1j + q2(N) ≥ p2i + q1(N)
}
– C1i = A1(N) ∪ {pi} ∪ D1i
– n02: total number of players with distinct second dimensions
– {M21, M22, · · · , M2n02 }: partition of M according to second dimensions
– Cdc : binomial coefficient (c choose d)
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Player Sets
– E1i =
{
p j ∈ M \
(
D1i ∪ {pi}
)
: p2j ≤ p
2
i
}
– D1(M2s) =
{
p j ∈ M : p1j + q2(N) ≥ q1(N) + q2(M2s)
}
– E1(M2s) =
{
p j ∈ M \
(
D1(M2s) ∪ M2s) : p2j < q2(M2s)
}
– ∆1 = A2(A1(N)) ∪
{
p j ∈ M : p2j ≥ q2
(
A1(N))}
– ∆∗1: a maximum subset of ∆1 s.t. no pair of players have the same second dimension.
– M+2 j =
{
pk ∈ M : p2k > p
2
j
}
–
¯D1 j =
{
pk ∈ M : p1k + q2(N) ≤ q1(N) + q2j
}
– E01i =
{
p j ∈ E1i : p1j ≥ q1
((C1i ∪ E1i)− ∪ {pi})}
–
ˆE1i =
{
p j ∈ E1i : q
((C1i \ {pi}) ∪ {p j}) ≤ q((C1i ∪ E1i)− ∪ {pi})}
–
ˆD1i =
{
p j ∈ E1i : p1j > q1
((C1i ∪ E1i)− ∪ {pi})}
–
ˆE1i j =
{
pk ∈ E1i : k , j, q((C1i \ {pi}) ∪ {pk}) ≤ p1j + q2(N)
}
–
ˆD1i j =
{
pk ∈ E1i : p1k > p
1
j
}
– E001i =
{
p j ∈ E01i : ˆD1i j ⊆ ˆE1i j
}
–
ˆDs1i =
{
p j ∈ E1i : p j > q1(M1s)
}
–
ˆE s1i =
{
pk ∈ E1i : q((C1i \ {pi}) ∪ {pk}) ≤ q1(M1s) + q2(N)
}
– M1∗ =
{
1 ≤ s ≤ n02 : q2
(
M2s) ≥ q2(A1(N) ∪ D1(M2s))}
Player Families
– MWC: set of minimal winning coalitions
– MWC( j): set of minimal winning coalitions where p j is a member
– MWC j: set of minimal winning coalitions where p j is busy
– WC: set of winning coalitions
– WC( j): set of winning coalitions where p j is decisive
– WC j: set of winning coalitions where p j is busy
– MWC1 =
{
C ∈ MWC : A1(N) ⊆ C, A2(N) ∩ C = ∅
}
– MWC2 =
{
C ∈ MWC : A2(N) ⊆ C, A1(N) ∩ C = ∅
}
– MWC3 =
{
C ∈ MWC : A1(N) ∩ C , ∅, A2(N) ∩ C , ∅
}
– MWC1i = {C ∈ MWC : A1(C) = A1(N), pi ∈ A2(C)}
– WC1 =
{
C ∈ WC : A1(N) ⊆ C, A2(N) ∩C = ∅
}
– WC2 =
{
C ∈ WC : A2(N) ⊆ C, A1(N) ∩C = ∅
}
– WC3 =
{
C ∈ WC : A1(N) ∩C , ∅, A2(N) ∩ C , ∅
}
– WC3(i) =WC3 ∩WC(i)
– WC1(i) =WC1 ∩WC(i)
– WC1(i, j) =WC1(i) ∩WC1 j
– WC1(i, M2s) = ⋃p j∈M2s WC1(i, j)
– H1i =
{
X− ∪ {pi} : X ∈ WC1(i, i)
}
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– B1i =
{
X = (C1i ∪ E1i)− ∪ {pi} ∪ E : E ⊆ E1i, X ∈ H1i, A1(X) ∩ E = ∅
}
– B1i j =
{
X = (C1i ∪ E1i)− ∪ {pi} ∪ E : E ⊆ E1i, X ∈ H1i, p j ∈ A1(X) ∩ E
}
Others
– l(i): the second index of pi ∈ M
– pl−1(i): the player in M whose second index is i
– x(i) = max
{
j : p j ∈ D1i
}
– y(i) = max
{
l( j) : p j ∈ D2i
}
– R1(i) = min
{
l( j) : 1 ≤ j ≤ i
}
– r1(i) = min
{
l( j) : 1 ≤ j ≤ i, l( j) , R1(i)
}
– n1: number of coalitions in MWC1, i.e. n1 = |MWC1|
– s2(i): the index s in {1, 2, · · · , n02} such that pi ∈ M2s
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